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INSIDER GUARANTIES: THEIR EFFECT ON THE
BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCE "REACH BACK" PERIOD
AND POSSIBLE USE IN GETTING AN "ORDINARY
COURSE" EXCEPTION FROM AVOIDANCE
Thomas D. Buckley*
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1990 the Sixth Circuit decided two bankruptcy preference
cases, Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage
Co.)' ("Cartage") and Gosch v. Burns (In re Finn)2 ("Finn"),
that will have important consequences in the administration of
bankruptcy proceedings and will also influence the way lenders
and borrowers do business with each other in the future, whether
or not a bankruptcy ever ensues.3 In Cartage the court followed
the famous (and to lenders infamous) Deprizio4 decision from
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall Col-
lege of Law; A.B. Fordham College, J.D. Yale Law School. The author is
indebted to Michelle Sublett, '91 CSU-CM College of Law, for invaluable
research assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990).
2. 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990).
3. There were also two less significant preference decisions: Belknap, Inc.
v. Shaler Corp. (In re Belknap, Inc.), 909 F.2d 879, 884 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that when payment is made by check, transfer occurs when the
creditor receives the check); Taunt v. Fidelity Bank of Michigan (In re Royal
Golf Prods. Corp.), 908 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that when a
debtor provides security to a creditor, the value of the security and the effect
on the debtor's estate of its transfer are to be determined as of the time the
security is given, not the date of bankruptcy).
4. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
The debtor in Levit was the V.N. Deprizio Construction Co.; the case was
known as In re Deprizio before it reached the Seventh Circuit and is commonly
referred to in the literature as Deprizio. See Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation
Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW.
2151 (1990). Deprizio had already been followed by the Tenth Circuit in
Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robinson Bros.
HeinOnline  -- 22 U. Tol. L. Rev. 247 1990-1991
TOLEDO LA W RE VIEW
the Seventh Circuit establishing a one year preference "reach
back" period for loans guarantied by "insiders"; in Finn it held
that repayments on long term debt may qualify for the "ordinary
course" exception from avoidance.5
In both cases the Sixth Circuit interpreted the text of the
Bankruptcy Code in the same literal, traightforward way. Yet
the results as far as preference law is concerned point in different
directions: Cartage significantly increases the bankruptcy trustee's
preference avoiding power; Finn, decided a few months later,
undercuts the first decision, diminishes the trustee's power, and
makes preference law in general less significant. Yet each decision
fairly reflects the preference law that Congress wrote.
This article first describes briefly the mechanics of preference
law and the application of it in Cartage and Finn. The article
then focuses primarily on the Cartage decision, because the
analytic approach taken by the court in Cartage has implications
for other preference issues. Cartage is evaluated in terms of the
text and structure of the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy
policy, and the effect that the rationale for the decision will
have on other preference issues. Next, the direct practical impact
of Cartage is examined, and it is in that context that Finn is
encountered. Finn's effect on preference law is considered, along
with what lenders can do to take advantage of its holding.
Finally, the article suggests what lenders can do to lessen the
impact of Cartage.
Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).
Before the 1989 Deprizio decision, most courts, including the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, applied the Bankruptcy Code's
standard non-insider 90 day preference reach back period to the recovery of
loan repayments from non-insiders, whether the loan was guarantied by insiders
or not. Backhus v. Central Trust Co., N.A. (In re Duccilli Formal Wear,
Inc.), 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1180 (S.D. Ohio 1982). See also T.B. Westex
Foods, Inc. v. Alaska Continental Bank (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 96
Bankr. 77, 81 (W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 82
(N.D. Tex. 1985); Davis Jay Corrugated Box Corp. v. David (In re Mercon
Indus.), 37 Bankr. 549, 552-53 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, however, had used the one year period. Coastal
Petroleum Corp. v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (In re Coastal Petroleum Corp.),
91 Bankr. 35, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1988). Cartage resolves the conflict between the
two Ohio cases and establishes a one year reach back period for insider
guarantied loans for the entire circuit.
5. Finn is in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision in CHG
Int'l, Inc. v. Barclays Bank (In re CHG Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir.
1990). Perhaps the Supreme Court will eventually resolve the conflict.
[Vol. 22
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II. PREFERENCE MECHANICS
A bankruptcy trustee is responsible for collecting a debtor's
assets, liquidating them, and distributing the proceeds among
the debtor's creditors.6 In gathering the assets the trustee can
exercise certain "avoiding" powers. The power to "avoid" a
transfer is the power to nullify a transfer of assets that the
debtor made before going into bankruptcy. If a transfer is
avoided, the assets transferred can be recovered under a separate
section of the Bankruptcy Code and added to the assets in the
debtor's "estate, ' 7 the pool of property available for distribution.
In exercising avoiding powers the trustee is acting on behalf of
all the unsecured creditors, the people who share in the division
of that pool.
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee the
power to avoid "preferences." Subsection (b) states the five
elements that the trustee must establish in order to do so;
essentially they allow avoidance of transfers made to or for the
benefit of a creditor with respect to antecedent debt.' Section
6. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). This description of preference mechanics
assumes for the sake of simplicity a chapter 7 liquidation case. In a chapter
11 case, where a trustee is normally not appointed and reorganization instead
of liquidation occurs, trustee powers and responsibilities are exercised on
behalf of unsecured creditors by the debtor itself.
7. Id. § 541. This section provides that the commencement of a bank-
ruptcy case creates "an estate" consisting of, inter alia, all the debtor's
interests in property, and any property the debtor's bankruptcy trustee recovers
under § 550.
8. Section 547(b) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider;
and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
Winter 199 1 ]
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547(c) states a series of exceptions from avoidance-transfers
that would be avoidable under the general rules of section 547(b),
but which are nevertheless not avoidable because of their special
nature.
In acting on behalf of the unsecured creditors when exercising
the preference avoiding power, the trustee's adversary will be a
former creditor, or a creditor who has already been paid in part
but not in whole by the debtor, and who in either event wants
to keep what it has received. In effect, the preference avoiding
power makes antagonists of two categories of creditors with
unsecured claims: those paid before bankruptcy, and those still
waiting to be paid out of the pool of assets that the debtor still
has when the bankruptcy process starts.
The Cartage case' focused on sections 547(b)(4) and 550 (the
separate section on liability for avoided transfers). Section
547(b)(4) provides that the trustee can avoid a transfer on
account of an antecedent debt if the transfer was made by the
debtor during the last ninety days before bankruptcy begins, or,
if the transfer was made with respect to an "insider," 9 if it was
made between ninety days and one year before bankruptcy.' 0
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
9. Id. § 101(30), which provides: "insider" includes-
(A) if the debtor is an individual-
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in
control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation-
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control
of the debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership-
(i) general partner of the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in
250 [Vol. 22
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The transfers in Cartage were made to one creditor, a lender,
and they benefitted other creditors, the "insiders" who had
guarantied repayment and who were better off because the
transfers were made. Cartage held that a lender whose loan is
guarantied by a corporate insider may have to surrender all loan
repayments received during the entire last year before the
borrower's bankruptcy;" were it not for the insider guaranty,
an arms length lender would be exposed to the bankruptcy.
trustee's preference avoiding power with respect to debt
repayments only if they were made during the last ninety days
before bankruptcy.' 2 An insider creditor is always subject to the
one year preference "reach back" period. Cartage applies the
longer, insider, period to the arms length outsider because of
the insider's guaranty that the loan will be repaid to the outsider. 3
The decision puts a creditor with an insider guaranty at a
disadvantage once bankruptcy begins, and it stretches the period
before bankruptcy during which such a creditor must remain
uncertain as to whether loan repayments already received can
be kept, or will have to be given up in exchange for claims
against an insolvent estate.
The Finn case dealt with section 547(c)(2), which states an
exception from avoidance for "ordinary course" transfers.
control of the debtor;
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative
of an elected official of the debtor;
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor;
and
(F) managing agent of the debtor.
10. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
11. 899 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir. 1990).
12. Id. at 1494.
13. Id.
14. Section 547(c)(2) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course
of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
Winter 1991 ]
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Section 547(c)(2) was amended in 1984;" before the amendment,
the section 547(c)(2) exception applied only if the debt repaid
had been incurred within forty-five days before it was repaid.
The forty-five day element was dropped in 1984. Finn held that
the amended section 547(c)(2) means what it says: long term
debt repayments as well as short term debt repayments are
eligible for exception from avoidance, provided the "ordinary
course" standards of the subsection are met.' 6
From the perspective of some creditors targeted for preference
attack (those with insider guaranties), Cartage increased four-
fold the range of the trustee's preference avoiding gun. But Finn
wet the trustee's gun powder; the avoidance gun won't fire at
all for numerous debt repayments, whether they are guarantied
or not, and no matter when they were made, so long as they
meet "ordinary course" standards. 7 Such payments are not
avoidable even though they were made to repay debts that were
long term and therefore quintessentially "antecedent."' ' 8
III. THE CARTAGE DECISION
Carlos Foster, the president and a principal in C-L Cartage,
was unable to obtain loans for his company on its own credit.
He learned that money would be made available by City Bank,
however, if he borrowed the funds himself, his mother Della
Foster cosigned, and the loans were secured with certificates of
deposit owned by Della Foster. City Bank then made two
advances on these terms to Carlos, one of $30,000 and one of
$20,000; certificates of deposit were pledged to the bank. Carlos
turned the loan proceeds over to the company for use in the
business. 19
A year after the first loan, C-L Cartage filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition seeking reorganization; that proceeding was
debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
15. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 378.
16. 909 F.2d 903, 906-08 (6th Cir. 1990).
17. Id. at 907.
18. Id. at 906-07.
19. 899 F.2d 1490, 1491 (6th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 22
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converted later to a Chapter 7 liquidation, and a trustee was
appointed. 20 Before the petition was filed, C-L Cartage had
made ten payments that were the subject of the trustee's avoidance
efforts. Each was a scheduled installment payment on one or
the other of the two loans City Bank had made to Carlos. Some
payments were made directly to the bank; others were made to
Della Foster who immediately endorsed the payment checks over
to the bank. Some payments were made within ninety days
before the bankruptcy petition was filed; others were made
earlier, but within one year before the bankruptcy. 21 The trustee
sought to recover all ten payments from the bank.
The Sixth Circuit held that all ten payments were subject to
avoidance under section 547 and recovery from the bank under
section 550.22 With respect to payments made indirectly, via
Della Foster, it remanded for a determination as to whether the
bank as an "immediate" (not "initial") "transferee" might
have a defense under section 550(b)(1), based on good faith and
lack of knowledge of avoidability. 23
Under section 547(b), to "avoid" transfers made more than
ninety days before bankruptcy the trustee had to establish that
the payments were made "to or for the benefit of a creditor'' 24
of C-L Cartage, "on account of an antecedent debt, ' 25 while
C-L Cartage was insolvent, 26 that "such creditor''27 was an
"insider,"' 2 and that "such creditor ... [would wind up better
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1491-92.
22. Id. at 1493.
23. Id. at 1495. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988) provides:
The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from-
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing
of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge
of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
Section 550(a)(2) provides for recovery from "any immediate or mediate
transferee of . . . [an] initial transferee." Id. § 550(a)(2).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1).
25. Id. § 547(b)(2).
26. Id. § 547(b)(3).
27. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
28. Id. § 101(30).
Winter 1991 ]
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off on account of the transfer than if] the transfer had not been
made." 29
Each payment "benefitted" the Fosters because it reduced
their obligation on the $50,000 in loans the bank had made to
them.30 And the Fosters were "insiders." But were the Fosters
"creditors ' 3 ' of C-L Cartage? And did C-L Cartage owe them
an antecedent "debt"? There was no promissory note or other
writing evidencing such a debt. 32 Nor were the Fosters listed as
creditors on the schedules C-L Cartage filed with its bankruptcy
petition. 33 The $50,000 paid into the company might have been
characterized as a contribution to capital, increasing Carlos'
equity position but not making him (or Della) a creditor. The
Sixth Circuit, however, adopted as not clearly erroneous the
finding by the district court that the Fosters were in fact creditors
of C-L Cartage because of their expectation that the company
would make the monthly payments due on their loans from City
Bank.3 Failure of C-L Cartage to make those payments would
have given rise to a "claim" 35 against it by the Fosters, and
because a creditor is a person holding a claim, including such
a "contingent" claim,3 6 the Fosters therefore were creditors.
29. Id. § 547(b)(5).
30. City Bank claimed that it was fully secured. Payment to a fully secured
creditor does not benefit a guarantor. See In re Deprizio, 874 F.2d 1186, 1199
(7th Cir. 1989). There was clearly benefit to the Fosters, however, because
the certificates of deposit securing the loans belonged to Della Foster, not to
C-L Cartage itself; each payment from C-L Cartage to City Bank thus reduced
the encumbrance on Foster property, which benefitted them.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1988) provides in part that 'creditor' means-
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor ....
32. 899 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir. 1990).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) defines "claim" broadly:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured ....
36. 899 F.2d at 1492-93. The court also rejected the bank's argument that
the finding of a debtor-creditor relationship between C-L Cartage and the
[Vol. 22254
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Although the court did not make it explicit, this reasoning also
established that there was a "debt" and that all ten payments
were "made on account of an antecedent debt. '" 37
C-L Cartage's insolvency when the transfers were made was
stipulated. With respect to section 547(b)(5), which makes
avoidance contingent on the advantage given to the preferred
creditor by the transfer, the bank argued that because its loans
were fully secured,3 9 it would not receive any more as a result
of the pre-petition transfers than it would have received upon
C-L Cartage's liquidation in chapter 7. 40 The bank was correct
that fully secured creditors usually receive no more through pre-
petition payments than they would collect upon payment of
their claims in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case.4' But the court said
that the "creditor" referred to in section 547(b)(5) was the same
creditor referred to in section 547(b)(1)-in other words, the
creditor to or for whose benefit the transfer was made.42 The
reference therefore was to the Fosters and not to City Bank.
What counted under section 547(b)(5) was the Fosters' net
position as a result of the ten transfers, not the bank's. The
Fosters were better off on account of the ten payments than
they would have been otherwise. Therefore, section 547(b)(5)
was satisfied. The bank's status as a secured creditor was not
relevant.
Fosters was wrong because it was necessarily premised on a violation of
Tennessee's statute of frauds, requiring suretyship agreements to be in writing.
The court said that when C-L Cartage paid the bank, it reduced its direct
obligation to the Fosters. It had never become liable to the bank or anyone
as a surety. Therefore, the suretyship provisions of the statute of frauds were
irrelevant. Id. at 1493.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) provides that a "'debt' means liability on a
claim."
38. 899 F.2d at 1492.
39. As the district court explains, it was not clear that the bank was really
fully secured. Ray v. Automotive Parts Exch. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 113
Bankr. 416, 417 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). But because of the Sixth Circuit's rejection
of the bank's entire § 547(b)(5) argument, the question did not have to be
resolved. See 899 F.2d at 1493.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988).
41. See, e.g., Gertz v. Bancohio Nat'l Bank (In re Conn), 9 Bankr. 431
(N.D. Ohio 1981). But Cartage was not a typical case because the collateral
did not belong to the debtor.
42. 899 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir. 1990).
Winter 1991]
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Thus the ten loan repayment transfers were "avoidable" under
section 547. Recapture of a preference by a trustee for a debtor's
bankruptcy estate is a two step process, however, involving first
the "avoidance" of the preferential transfer under section 547,
and then the actual recovery of the assets preferentially
transferred, or their value, from the party liable to the trustee
under section 550. 41 Section 550(a)(1) provides for such recovery
from either "the initial transferee ... or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made." 44Since each of the ten payments
benefitted the Fosters, recovery from them was clear. But the
trustee sought recovery from City Bank. The court's holding on
recovery from City Bank resulted "directly from an application
of the unambiguous statutory language. ' 45 City Bank was the
recipient of seven direct payments from the debtor. City Bank
was therefore the "initial transferee" of seven payments, and
the trustee could recover the seven payments from the bank.
Recovery from the bank of the amount represented by three
checks endorsed over to it by Della Foster was governed by
section 550(a)(2), which provides for recovery from an
"immediate or mediate transferee of 'such initial transferee."
Because the bank as immediate transferee had not had a chance
to assert the good faith and lack of knowledge defense available
to "immediate" transferees, the court remanded. 46
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit rejected the district
court's determination that it would be "inequitable" to make
the bank, an outsider, surrender preferences made more than
ninety days before bankruptcy and avoidable only with respect
to insiders. There was no room for the exercise of such equitable
43. Id. at 1494-95.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). This section provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer
is avoided under section ... 547 ... of this title, the trustee may recover,
for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made; or(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
45. 899 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1990).
46. Id. at 1495.
256 [Vol. 22
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powers when the statute spoke as plainly as did sections 547(b)
and 550.47
The court also rejected as "tortured" a reading of sections
547 and 550 under which each payment would be viewed as
constituting "two transfers," one to the outsider, and one for
the benefit of the insider.4 Insider transfers would be recoverable
under this theory if they occurred during the extended, one
year, reach back period; but the other "transfer," to an outsider
such as City Bank, would be avoidable and recoverable from
City Bank only if it occurred within ninety days before the
debtor filed its bankruptcy petition. 49 In rejecting the two-
transfer theory, the Sixth Circuit quoted Deprizio to the effect
that the Bankruptcy Code defined the word "transfer" with
respect to payments from the perspective of the debtor who
paid, not from the perspective of others who received or who
were benefitted: "'A single payment ... is one transfer, no
matter how many persons gain thereby."'" Thus, one might
paraphrase both Deprizio and Cartage and say that even if one
stone kills two birds, there is still only one stone-and one, not
two, transfers.
Finally, the court concluded that its reading of the statutes
was consistent with the policies behind sections 547 and 550.
An extended one year reach back period was appropriate because
insiders such as the Fosters could use their control over a debtor
such as C-L Cartage to see to it that C-L Cartage would pay
outsiders such as City Bank and thus simultaneously favor
themselves throughout the entire one year extended preference
period; prevention of such favoritism toward some creditors was
the reason for enactment of section 547 in the first place."
47. Id. at 1494.
48. Id. at 1495 (quoting, Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and
550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 530, 540 (1989)).
49. The two-transfer theory had been approved in several cases. See, e.g.,
Block v. Texas Commerce Nat'l Bank Ass'n (In re Midwestern Co.), 102
Bankr. 169, 171 (W.D. Mo. 1989); In re Installation Serv., 101 Bankr. 282,
284 (N.D. Ala. 1989); Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corrugated Box Corp. (In re
Mercon Indus.), 37 Bankr. 549, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
50. 899 F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Deprizio, 874 F.2d
1186, 1196 (7th Cir. 1989)).
51. Id.
Winter 1991 ]
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IV. THE CARTAGE DECISION AND THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. The Code Text
In evaluating the textual case for the holding reached by the
Sixth Circuit in Cartage it is helpful to understand at the outset
that there would have been no textual issue at all about the
trustee's power to recover all ten payments from the Fosters
had the trustee sought to do so. It is clear that every element
in section 547(b)'s formula for avoidance is satisfied with respect
to them, and that as the persons "for whose benefit . . . [the]
transfer was made" recovery of each payment from the Fosters
is clearly provided for in section 550. The Fosters' liability to
the trustee, had they been called to account instead of City
Bank, would have been a foregone conclusion and would have
followed from an obvious, literal, straightforward, and
noncontroversial reading of the text of the Code.
In Cartage the Sixth Circuit also said that such a "literal"
and "straightforward" reading led inexorably to recognition of
the trustee's power to recover from City Bank.5 2 Thus the
"avoidance" part of that argument against the bank under
section 547(b) was identical to the argument the trustee would
have made against the Fosters-indeed their "benefit" is what
made the pre-ninety day transfers avoidable under section 547.
Therefore, to the extent that a textual challenge to the holding
in Cartage is focused on the text of section 547(b) and the Sixth
Circuit's reading of that text, a challenger would have to 1)
reject the court's reading of the text as it applied to non-insiders
such as City Bank, and yet somehow simultaneously 2) accept
the very same reading with respect to insiders such as the Fosters.
Positing that "two transfers" occur when a single payment is
made provides a method to accomplish that interpretive goal.
In operation, the two-transfer theory would require that each
of the payments at issue in Cartage be analyzed twice: once as
a transfer to an outsider creditor (City Bank) and once as a
transfer for the benefit of an insider creditor (the Fosters). The
52. 899 F.2d 1490, 1495 (6th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 22
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payments occurring between ninety days and one year before
bankruptcy would then be avoidable transfers with respect to
the insider creditor (under section 547(b)(4)(B)), and yet
simultaneously would not be avoidable transfers with respect to
the outsider creditor (under section 547(b)(4)(A)). Each single
payment's status as both avoidable and non-avoidable would
then be given practical significance by section 550, which provides
for "recovery" by the trustee of transfers "to the extent" they
are avoided. A transfer or payment avoided "to the extent" it
benefitted an insider would be recoverable; but the same payment
as a transfer to an outsider would not be recoverable because
"to the extent" it was to the outsider it was not avoidable in
the first place. Since each of the two transfers was really only
a single payment, the logic of the two-transfer theory (but not
the text of section 550) then requires that recovery of the
payment be only from the insider who benefitted.
The Sixth Circuit's characterization of this interpretative process
as "tortured" seems fair. The two-transfer theory obviously
depends on an ingenious, result-driven reading of the text of
sections 547(b) and 550. If this were all there was to it, the
Sixth Circuit's summary rejection of the two-transfer analysis
would appear sound.
There is more however. It has been suggested that a textual
case for the two-transfer theory arises when section 547's overall
internal coherence is examined, specifically the connection
between section 547(b) and section 547(d), 3 a subsection that
has nothing to do with insiders and that had no part to play in
the actual decision-making process in Cartage. Section 547(d)
provides:
The trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of the
debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure
reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other
obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoid-
able by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability
of such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged
53. Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended Pref-
erence Exposure Via Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils of Initial Transferee
Liability, 45 Bus. LAw. 511, 524-25 (1990).
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to the extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee
or the amount paid to the trustee.14
This subsection operates if a debtor, before bankruptcy, had
posted a bond to get a judicial lien removed from property
seized by a judgment creditor, and if the "debtor had granted a
mortgage to the surety/bonding company to induce it to issue
the bond. Under the first sentence of section 547(d) the mortgage
granted to the surety can be avoided. In exchange, under the
second sentence, the surety is given freedom from liability on
the bond. The levying creditor winds up with neither the asset
it seized in the first place, nor the protection of the bond; but
that is exactly what the levying creditor would have wound up
with if no bond had been issued and the trustee had avoided
the (involuntary) transfer of the seized asset pursuant to section
547(b).
Why does this subsection imply that one transaction is two
transfers, not just one transfer? The reasoning is clear. The
granting or transfer of the mortgage to the surety benefitted the
levying creditor to whom an antecedent debt was owed. If that
event is but "one transfer," it is susceptible to avoidance under
section 547(b) without the necessity of any special statutory
treatment in the first sentence of section 547(d). On the other
hand, if that event can be viewed as two transfers, one to the
surety and one for the benefit of the creditor, then it is not
avoidable with respect to the surety because it is not on account
of an antecedent debt: the surety provides its credit in the form
of the bond contemporaneously with the granting of the
mortgage. If section 547(b) is to be read as dealing with "one
transfer" for every payment or other event in which an interest
in the debtor's property moves to another person, there would
have been no need to enact the first sentence of section 547(d).
Yet Congress enacted it. Ergo, section 547(b) should be read as
requiring or at least allowing a two-transfer analysis.
The persuasiveness of this neat little argument depends on
how one accounts for the inclusion in the statute of section
547(d)'s first sentence. Clearly Congress wanted the surety's lien
avoided. But did it include sentence-one because if it had not
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547(d) (1988).
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done so, the lien would not be avoided? Or, is there some other
explanation for including it?
If the answer is the former, if sentence-one is indispensable
to achieving the congressional intent and had to be there or else
the surety's lien would escape avoidance, then the two-transfer
theory is strengthened because the two-transfer approach would
allow avoidance versus the lien creditor while simultaneously
protecting the surety. A specific negation of the implications of
the two-transfer theory would thus be required in special situations
where Congress wanted a certain result incompatible with its
ordinary operation. The surety situation covered by section
547(d) would then be seen as one such special situation needing
special statutory attention. The norm, in the absence of something
like section 547(d) sentence-one, would be the two-transfer
approach. This explanation for the first sentence is a possibility;
it cannot be ruled out categorically. But is it a probability?
That depends on what other explanation may be available to
account for the subsection.
Section 547(d) is derived from section 67(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898."1 Did the copying of the substance of section 67(a)
into the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 carry with it a negative
implication about what the law would be if it had been left
out? Or, did Congress put it in the new law because section
67(a) identified the section 547(d) surety situation, and Congress
wanted the law to continue to operate as before? This too is a
possibility. And it is the more probable explanation for section
547(d)'s first sentence.
The latter explanation's higher probability is a function of
the probability or likelihood of the premise for each possible
explanation. The premise for the historical, section 67(a),
explanation is simply that Congress knew about and approved
the substance of section 67(a). The legislative history establishes
this. The premise for the other, "two-transfer," explanation is
55. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADnhm. NEws 5787, 5874-75; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 374, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS 5963, 6330.
Section 67(a) gave the trustee the power to avoid preferences received by
levying creditors. Such an involuntary transfer of the debtor's property was
not avoidable under the main preference section of the 1898 Act, § 60. Under
the broad definition of transfer in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, voluntary
and involuntary preferences are both avoidable under § 547.
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that 1) Congress knew about or itself conceived the two-transfer
theory, that it 2) approved of that approach for general use in
interpreting section 547(b), but 3) did not explicitly say so or
codify this approval, while 4) it did codify (in section 547(d))
an exception from that approach. There is no evidence to
establish any of this. Therefore, given a simple (and non-circular)
explanation for section 547(d)'s first sentence, it seems better to
accept it instead of imputing to Congress the intent to legislate
a general rule sub silentio while codifying only its exception.16
Viewed this way, section 547(d) supports rather than detracts
from the Cartage decision's rejection of the two-transfer
approach. It manifests the underlying congressional intent to
apply avoidance law to transferees (such as both the surety and
non-insiders with insider guarantied loans) whose own status
and characteristics, in isolation, would not render them vulnerable
to the avoidance power.
Furthermore, this explanation for putting section 547(d)
sentence-one into section 547 seems even more plausible when
section 547(d)'s second sentence is considered. The second
sentence states positive substantive law that can be found nowhere
else in the Bankruptcy Code. The granting of protection to the
surety (discharge of its obligation on the bond) can then be seen
as the real addition to the law made by section 547(d). The first
sentence then becomes not so much a statement of a separate
avoiding power as a preface to the real substance of the
subsection.
In any event, in calculating the probabilities concerning why
section 547(d) appears in the Bankruptcy Code and what it
means in terms of the two-transfer theory, it should be kept in
mind that section 547(d) is a relatively minor provision. There
is only one reported case in which it was invoked by a bankruptcy
56. There are other instances of specific statutory attention to a particular
matter that do not imply that some general rule requires a different result.
For example, the explicit, detailed, and particularized protection given to
shopping center landlords under § 365(b)(3)(A), (B), (C), and (D) when a
shopping center tenant goes into bankruptcy, does not necessarily imply that
courts could not have been as generous to such landlords by applying the
general rule of § 365(b)(1)(C), giving all lessors "adequate assurance of future
performance" by debtors or their assignees.
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trustee, and in that case the facts did not warrant its actual
application to avoid a transfer.17 Collier's Treatise ignores it,
skipping from coverage of section 547(c) directly to treatment
of section 547(e).5 1 Section 547(d) is a fragile foundation on
which to construct or justify the elaborate statutory interpretation
edifice that is the two-transfer theory.
B. The Structure of the Code
Like the textual argument, the "structural" argument against
outsider (City Bank) liability for pre-ninety day repayments has
to accommodate the simultaneous liability of the insiders (the
Fosters) for the same repayments. It does so by rejecting the
idea that one payment is two transfers, conceding that the
(single) transfer is avoidable under section 547, but then limiting
the trustee's power to recover it under section 550. The argument
discerns in the structure and history of the Bankruptcy Code a
congressional intent that recovery under section 550(a)(1) (from
initial transferees and people benefitted by the transfer) be
limited to the same "creditors," whose own conduct or status
was a predicate for avoidance under section 547(b). Since outsider
status was not a predicate for avoidance of pre-ninety day loan
repayments, outsiders would not be liable for them under section
550(a)(1). Instead, outsiders such as City Bank would always be
treated as if they were "immediate or mediate" transferees from
initial transferees and would therefore always qualify for the
good faith and lack of knowledge defense of section 550(b).5 9
City Bank would therefore have qualified for the defense on all
payments, not just for the three payments made via Della Foster.
The argument begins with the observation that Congress has
established in sections 550(a)(1) and (a)(2) two distinct classes
of persons liable for the return of avoided transfers, giving each
57. In re M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 25 Bankr. 608, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Section 547(d) appears in the reports more often as a typographical error (five
times) than as a genuine cite (four times). See, e.g., Edmondson v. Bradford-
White Corp. (In re Tinnell Traffic Servs., Inc.), 41 Bankr. 1018, 1021 (M.D.
Tenn.), motion denied, 43 Bankr. 280 (1984) (typo); Nolden v. Van Dyke
Seed Co. (In re Gold Coast Seed Co.), 35 Bankr. 12 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (typo);
In re Evans, 78 Bankr. 145, 146 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (dictum).
58. 4 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 547.15-547.16 (15th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter COLLIER].
59. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988).
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class different defenses against liability. 6° Recovery from persons
liable under section 550(a)(2) is subject to the defenses of good
faith and lack of knowledge of avoidability; by contrast, section
550(a)(1) states no defense for persons liable thereunder. 6' But
this does not mean that initial transferees and entities benefitted
by the transfer (the persons liable under section 550(a)(1)) have
no defenses. On the contrary, the legislative history accompanying
what became section 550 stated that "[v]ariances [in appropriate
defenses] required as to the treatment of initial transferees are
handled in the avoidance sections.'' 62 That is, for preferences
for example, defenses available to persons liable under section
550(a)(1) would be found in section 547(b) itself and in section
547(c), which provides a list of seven exceptions from avoidability
for transfers otherwise avoidable under section 547(b). 63
It is clear too that it would be inappropriate to give such
"creditors," whose conduct is the predicate for avoidabilty
under section 547(b), the section 550(a)(2) and section 550(b)
defenses. Those defenses include lack of knowledge of
avoidability; one of the significant changes in preference law
worked by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code was the dropping
of creditor knowledge of avoidability as a factor in avoiding a
preference. 64 To put such "knowledge" back into the calculus
at the recovery stage would make no sense.
While this observation effectively disconnects the "creditors"
whose conduct is the predicate for avoidance under section 547
from the entities liable under section 550(a)(2), it still leaves
room for reading section 550(a)(1) as applying to more people
than just those (such as the Fosters with respect to pre-ninety
day loan repayments) whose conduct was the predicate for
60. See Note, supra note 48, at 541-49.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988) (Historical and Revision Notes).
62. REPORT OF THE COMISSION ON THE BANKRUpTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93 Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2 at 179 (1973). See
Note, supra note 48, at 546.
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)-(c).
64. Section 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that a preference
could be avoided only if the creditor receiving it or benefitted by it had
"reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." Act of June 22,
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 60(b), 52 Stat. 840, 870 (repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title IV, Nov. 6, 1978, § 401(a),
92 Stat. 2659, 2682). Section 547(b) has no such requirement.
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avoidance. That is, even if "predicate creditors" are never to
be given section 550(a)(2) and (b) treatment and are always to
be liable for recovery under section 550(a)(1), why is section
550(a)(1) reserved exclusively for them? Why must the "initial
transferee" be only the same creditor whose conduct is a predicate
for avoidance under section 547(b), and no one else (such as
City Bank)?
Here is where the structural argument apparently founders,
or convinces. And it is here too that it must confront the actual
words that Congress used when it enacted its structurally separate
bases of liability with their separate defenses in sections 550(a)(1)
and (a)(2). For the argument fundamentally rests on the
persuasiveness of its analysis of "structure" -that the separation
within the Bankruptcy Code of "avoidance" from "recovery,"
which was a change from the approach of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, and the further separation within the Code's schema
of defenses of "avoidance section" defenses from section 550(b)
defenses, necessarily imply the applicability, always, of the latter
defenses to "non-predicate" (non-section 547(b)) creditors.
To support this analysis, its proponents rely, to an extent, on
history. Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1979,
recovery of avoided transfers was possible only from persons
whose conduct was a predicate for avoidance. Structural analysis
proponents argue that any departure from that old law would
have been made explicit or been signaled more directly had
change been intended by Congress.6 5 This historical argument is
considerably weakened, however, because the specific preference
issue raised by the insider guaranty did not exist before 1979.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 there was only one reach
back period, of four months, and it applied whether transfers
went to or benefitted insiders or outsiders."
The other reasons offered to buttress the structural theory
are, first, that the purpose of setting up two bases for liability
and recovery in section 550 was primarily to deny the section
547(b) ("predicate") creditors any defenses other than section
547 defenses, and to give the other defense (e.g., good faith
65. See Note, supra note 48, at 544; Borowitz, supra note 4, at 2160 n.26.
66. See 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 562
(repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, title
IV, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2682).
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under sections 550(a)(2) and (b)) to other, non-predicate creditors.
However, goes the argument, there is no reason to think that
in limiting predicate creditors to the section 547(b) and (c)
defenses Congress wanted to deny those defenses (that is, section
547(b) and (c) defenses) to other people (such as City Bank).
And therefore such other creditors should be allowed to invoke
them.6 7 Secondly, or perhaps put another way, Congress would
not have intended to deny such people (City Bank) all defenses.
Denying the non-section 547(b), non-predicate creditors the
section 550(b) defenses, and also not letting them rely on status
or facts that would insulate transfers involving them from
avoidance under section 547 (e.g., non-insider status and pre-
ninety day loan repayments constitute no avoidance under section
547(b)) would have the effect of depriving such people of any
defense at all. It is unlikely, it is argued, that Congress would
do that."
Such is the structural case for holding that City Bank should
get the defenses allowed under section 550(b). The argument
then confronts the statutory words: The words, as distinct from
the structure, say that the people entitled to the those defenses
are "immediate and mediate transferees" from initial transferees,
and that the people not entitled to those defenses are the "initial
transferees. "69 City Bank took several pre-ninety day transfers
directly from the debtor corporation. Is not City Bank described,
inescapably, by the term "initial transferee"? And is it not
difficult to characterize it as a "transferee from" anyone but
the debtor (to bring it within section 550(b)(2))? Does not the
structural argument, whatever its merits might be in terms of
structure, fall apart when faced with the plain meaning of
"initial transferee"? Not necessarily.
The term "initial transferee" may not be as self-explanatory
as it appears to be. There is authority, which appears to be
plausible and non-controversial, for reading "initial transferee"
not to include people who take transfers directly from the debtor
when those takers are mere conduits such as banks or lawyers
67. See Note, supra 48, at 546-47.
68. Id. at 547.
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1988).
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who happened to be the first persons to handle a preferential
transfer as it was transmitted from debtor to creditor. 70 Such
conduits did not by their conduct or status provide a predicate
for avoidance under section 547(b). They were akin to City
Bank (for pre-ninety day transfers) in that regard. Of course
those conduits were not even creditors of the debtors in their
cases either; they were in that regard quite unlike City Bank.
Nevertheless, when given a good reason to read "initial
transferee" narrowly, courts have fearlessly done so.
The question then is whether this structural analysis provides
a good enough reason for courts to narrow the meaning of
"initial transferee" even further in order to protect arms length
lenders such as City Bank. Or, does this structural argument
actually do no more than demonstrate a possible imperfection
in Congress' treatment of defenses to avoidance? In that event,
the analysis would not be "wrong." But it would not be limpidly
compelling either, in the sense that it would prove conclusively
that City Bank (the only transferee of seven payments) was
somehow entitled to defenses given, by the words of section
550(b)(1), to people further down a chain of successive transfers.
Thus in the end the structural argument, like the textual
argument, must deal with what the law ought to be. That is,
assuming Congress had actually thought about it and wanted to
do the right thing, not only about appropriate defenses but also
about overall liability on the part of outsider creditors for insider
guarantied loan repayments made more than ninety days before
bankruptcy, what would it have said? (Hopefully it would have
put its intention into words instead of imbedding it deep within
the structure of the Code.) That inquiry leads to the next section.
V. THE CARTAGE DECISION AtD BANKRUPTCY POLICY
What reach back period should apply to City Bank-the ninety
day period normally applied to "outsiders," or the special
"insider" one-year period which did apply to the insiders who
70. See, e.g., Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d
890, 893 (7th Cir. 1988) (bank handling preferential transfer); Gropper v.
Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 334, 336-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (lawyer handling preferential transfer).
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had guarantied the City Bank loans? Should City Bank be
treated for preference reach back purposes as if it were an
insider, because of the insider guaranty? The answer depends
on bankruptcy policy on preferences in general, and on reach
back periods in particular.
Understanding preference policy begins with recognizing that
the reason for having bankruptcy law itself is that creditors as
a group benefit from a collective administration of an insolvent
debtor's affairs.7 ' A collective proceeding is better for creditors,
as a group, because the debtor's assets may be more valuable
if they are kept together and operated (as in a reorganization
bankruptcy) or (as in a liquidation bankruptcy) if they can be
disposed of in the least distressed, most orderly manner. In
addition, duplication of efforts may be eliminated and other
economies realized through a single focused proceeding.
The benefit to creditors is maximized since the total value of
debtor's assets available for distribution among them will be
greater than the sum of the values of the assets that each
separate creditor would be able to realize if each creditor acted
71. As Professor Jackson stated:
The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a
normative matter and as a positive matter, is that the system of individual
creditor remedies may be bad for the creditors as a group when there are
not enough assets to go around. Because creditors have conflicting rights,
there is a tendency in their debt-collection efforts to make a bad situation
worse. Bankruptcy law responds to this problem.
T. JACKSON, TnE LooIc AND LiMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10 (1986) (emphasis
added).
This sharply focused position is not unchallenged: "My view is that the
central job of bankruptcy is to apportion the losses of the debtor's default,
and that a variety of factors impinge on the difficult policy decision of where
to let those losses fall." Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 775,
810 (1987) (a debate with Professor Baird, who shares with Professor Jackson
the view that bankruptcy law should not redistribute a debtor's assets, but
merely maximize the assets available to be distributed according to non-
bankruptcy entitlements). See Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 815 (1987). See also D.
BAmD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 37-
43 (2d ed. 1990). In a review of the first edition of the Baird and Jackson
casebook, Professor Scott said that Baird and Jackson's articles "have set the
terms of the scholarly debate for the next decade." Scott, Through Bankruptcy
with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 690, 692 (1986).
One need not choose sides to accept the proposition that it would be desirable
for bankruptcy to maximize a debtor's estate.
[Vol. 22
HeinOnline  -- 22 U. Tol. L. Rev. 268 1990-1991
INSIDER GUARANTIES
alone in collecting its claim. 72 The idea is that the whole is
greater than the sum of the parts, when the separate parts are
what individual creditors would realize collecting their claims
one at a time. The price paid to participate in the collective
proceeding is the forgoing of pure self interest. For the chance
at a share in a bigger whole, creditors in bankruptcy give up
the opportunity to attempt to get 100 percent of their claims by
proceeding alone. 73
If creditors did act alone, some would profit in doing so;
others would not. While the total realized by all creditors as a
group would be less, from the perspective of the creditors who
succeeded in getting 100 percent of their claims the non-collective,
non-bankruptcy approach would be better. From the point of
view of the creditors who did not do better through their own
non-collective enterprise, the gain to be realized in bankruptcy
would be lost and they would be worse off: The "whole"
available for distribution would be smaller, not bigger, if some
creditors had escaped the collective proceeding.
The collective advantage of bankruptcy depends therefore on
a method for preventing some creditors from escaping the
collective proceeding. The creation of a debtor's "estate"
consisting of all the debtor's assets, leaving nothing to be
distributed outside of bankruptcy, effectively prevents some
creditors from escaping the process once bankruptcy begins. A
mechanism is also needed to prevent creditors from escaping
before the proceeding starts. It would have to deter such pre-
bankruptcy escape attempts, and undo them if not deterred. 74
Preference law is that deterrent.7 Whether creditors have
grabbed assets by means of attachments, or have judicial liens,
72. T. JACKSON, supra note 71, at 12-13.
73. Id. at 14-16.
74. See id. at 122-23.
75. Professor Jackson says it this way:
Preference law should . . . be concerned with postloan behavior directed
at attempts to improve one's relative status in an impending collective
proceeding such as bankruptcy-attempts to opt out of the class of
unsecured creditors into a class of paid (or secured) creditors. It is, in
short, designed to deter individual opt-out behavior that would undermine
the advantages to be gained from a collective proceeding.
T. JACKSON, supra note 71, at 125-26. See also Countryman, The Concept of
a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VA". L. REv. 713 (1985).
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or have taken voluntary payments from the debtor, section 547
on preferences will require the creditors to give back to the
estate what they have received from it. 6 The advantage of taking
planks and pieces of the debtor's boat is nullified. Preference
law encourages creditors to act as if they were all in the same
boat and will be better off in it together than floating around
on its parts separately." Creditor self interest must be modulated
by the realization that if vital assets are taken (perhaps putting
out of business a firm that could otherwise survive), the action
taken will itself precipitate bankruptcy and the operation of
section 547. Hence the premature action may not be taken at
all. The same creditor calculation must be made before loans
are called in or other payments on debt accepted. Diligence and
vigilance are not rewarded; forbearance is.
Preference law has its intended deterrent effect so long as all
participants in the debtor-creditor relationship are contemplating
an eventual bankruptcy. In that context, preference law serves
to allay the apprehensions of creditors of a declining firm who
are not getting paid, and who are not levying liens or otherwise
seizing debtor property. While such patient creditors may be
apprehensive that others are receiving "preferences," their mere
suspicions should not be enough to make them seek immediate
preferences for themselves. For if worse comes to worst, and
their suspicions are valid, a little more delay in self interested
action will not be fatal: they know that section 547 will undo
what the more aggressive creditors have done on their own
behalf.
There are limits, however, to how much forbearance is really
a good idea. No one thinks that in bankruptcy a debtor's affairs
back to its inception should be examined, or that every entity
that ever became a creditor should be called to account for
having received debt repayments when the debtor was insolvent.
Not only would this not be feasible administratively, but at
some point a failing firm's losses should be cut and it should
be put out of business, possibly through a seizure of its vital
physical assets or its working capital. The question then becomes
how long a patient creditor's mere suspicions should be allayed
by preference law; or, put another way, at what point should
76. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
77. See T. JACKSON, supra note 71, at 123-30.
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the law stop encouraging patience in the face of a declining
firm whose payment practices are unknown, and instead
encourage the creditors either to lose patience and put it into
bankruptcy or investigate to find out if preferences are actually
being paid to some creditors? Congress has chosen two time
periods. One, of ninety days, for routine situations and another,
of one year, for situations in which insiders are creditors. 78
Normally if a debtor is being dismembered, Congress thought
creditors should be able to find out about it within ninety days
and put the debtor's estate back together again by forcing
bankruptcy and invoking the trustee's preference avoiding
powers. 79 However, an insider will know more about the debtor's
bad financial condition than outsiders; the insider will therefore
be in a position to make grabs for itself, discreetly, earlier.
Insiders may be dismembering the debtor before its bad condition
is apparent to outsiders. Outsiders however, will know this may
happen. Hence, outsiders will be more eager to take assets, even
if things look fairly good and no discernable asset grabs are
taking place. Appearances may be deceiving them, they know,
but not deceiving the insiders. To prevent this from happening,
the one-year reach back period is provided. Outsiders will rest
easier knowing that even if some insider grabbing is going on,
its chance of injuring the outsider is less because there is an
entire year in which to discover that the debtor is going bottom
up, and to recapture what the insider has taken. Thus, the one-
year period deters early raids on the debtor's assets which may
be harmful to creditors on the whole.
These considerations indicate that it makes sense to apply the
one year reach back period to insider guarantied loans. 80 The
intended deterrent effect on creditors, which should keep them
from putting a debtor into bankruptcy prematurely, depends on
78. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4).
79. Id. § 547(b).
80. Doing so does not create a judicial presumption that every lender with
an insider guaranty is a "person in control of the debtor" and therefore itself
an "insider." See id. § 101(30)(B)(iii). "Whatever tests of 'control' may evolve
under the Code, they are irrelevant to a determination that, as a matter of
economic and psychological reality, the personal guaranty of an insider may
be better security for repayment before bankruptcy than legal interests in a
debtor's property." Pitts, Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55
AM. BANKR. L.J. 343, 354 (1981).
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increasing their willingness to live with uncertainty. Creditors
not getting paid regularly will be willing to do so longer (but
not too long) if there is no sign of "normal" non-insider
preferences and if the more invisible insider preferences, which
may or may not be taking place, are not going to succeed.
Forbearing creditors who know there may be guarantied loans
are allowed to assume the likelihood, but not the risk, that the
insiders may act in their own self interest and direct payment
of such loans preferentially. Patient creditors will not assume
the risk of that possibility because of the one year reach back
period. Throwing debtors into premature bankruptcy will thus
not be encouraged. And preference law purposes will be achieved.
These considerations about the purpose and effect of preference
law should also serve to make clear what is not its main purpose:
redressing wrongs and punishing bad behavior.
Preference law can be usefully contrasted with fraudulent
conveyance law. 81 The pool of a debtor's assets is diminished
by a fraudulent conveyance without any countervailing benefit
to the debtor's situation; when a preference occurs the debtor
does receive the benefit of a decrease in the amount of total
outstanding obligations. 2 Harm is inevitable with a fraudulent
conveyance; harm is not inevitable with a preference. A preference
is undesirable not because it does harm but because it may
prevent creditors from reaping the positive advantages of the
collective process.
This is not to say that avarice and misbehavior are never
present when a preference occurs. The point is that a preference
is a preference and should be avoided whether or not the
participants are "guilty" or "innocent" of anything. This is
important because many of the lower court decisions in conflict
with Deprizio and Cartage are based on the idea that it is
somehow not "fair" or "equitable" to a non-insider lender to
apply to it the reach back period intended for insider lenders.83
81. "Preference law, unlike fraudulent conveyance law, is not a part of
the arsenal of rights and remedies between a debtor and its creditors. Rather,
preference law focuses on relationships among creditors in light of the advan-
tages of a collective proceeding." T. JAcKsoN, supra note 71, at 123-24
(emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., In re C-L Cartage Co., 113 Bankr. 416, 420 (E.D. Tenn.
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It is a fact that there is nothing wrong with insisting that a
borrower provide a guaranty from an insider. But that observation
is beside the point when the question is whether the insider
guaranty should have an influence on how preference law is
administered. Since the law is not intended to punish, its adverse
effect on the "innocent" is not a relevant criticism.8 In this
light, the "equitable" argument against applying the one-year
reach back period to outsiders with insider guaranties establishes
nothing. The potential that preference law will eventually be
enforced is what keeps all the creditors in line before bankruptcy;
it would frustrate that law if "good" creditors could be excepted
from the operation of the law. Its real point is its deterrent
effect. That effect is lost to the extent some preferences are
immune from avoidance.8 5
1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); Backhus
v. Central Trust Co., N.A. (In re Duccilli Formal Wear, Inc.), 8 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 1180, 1183 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A.
Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888, 893-94 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Bakst v. Schilling
(In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843, 844 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
A passage in the Collier Treatise is frequently quoted by such cases:
In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a) would permit
the trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and
deserves protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy court should
use its equitable powers to prevent an inequitable result. For example...
if a transfer is made to a creditor who is not an insider more than 90
days but within one year before bankruptcy and the effect is to prefer
an insider-guarantor, recovery should be restricted to the guarantor and
the creditor should be protected. Otherwise, a creditor who does not
demand a guarantor can be better off than one who does.
4 CoLmit, supra note 58, 550.02, at 550-58 (footnotes omitted).
84. The Seventh Circuit made a similar point in Deprizio:
Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary arrangements do not operate
"inequitably" in the business world-at least not once the rule is under-
stood. Prices adjust. If the extended preference period facilitates the
operation of bankruptcy as a collective debt-adjustment process, then
credit will become available on slightly better terms.
874 F.2d 1186, 1198 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Nussbaum, Insider Preferences
and the Problem of Self-Dealing Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CH. L.
Rlv. 603, 614-15 (1990); Pitts, supra note 80, at 354-56.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988).
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VI. CARTAGE'S EFFECT ON PREFERENCE ANALYSIS IN NON-
INSIDER GUARANTY SITUATIONS
The Cartage decision has implications in other preference
contexts where the "two-transfer" theory might be applied. In
one, use of the two-transfer theory facilitates the defense against
avoidance of a lien granted to a bank that has issued a standby
letter of credit; in the other, the theory protects an oversecured
creditor from preference attack. Since it is an article of faith in
commercial law that letters of credit are independent of the
underlying transaction out of which they arose, and since it is
also virtually axiomatic that oversecured creditors have nothing
to fear from preference law, an analysis such as the two-transfer
analysis that produces results consistent with those expectations
has a great deal of intuitive appeal. Conversely, a case such as
Cartage, which rejects such a theory, seems to that extent
questionable. Even if the result in Cartage with respect to the
appropriate reach back period for outsiders with insider guaranties
were regarded as a good one in its own right, its rationale would
seem to need rethinking if it led to awkward outcomes in other
cases. Examination of these other preference situations, however,
reveals that the implications are not that bad-a one-transfer
theory does not necessarily self destruct when put to other tests
in other contexts.
A. Implications for Letters of Credit
The letter of credit situation has already arisen in two cases
decided by courts of appeals, In re Compton 6 and In re Air
Conditioning.87 In both cases a bank had issued a standby letter
of credit for debtor's account for the benefit of a creditor
holding an already overdue antecedent claim. 88 In each case the
issuing bank had been granted a lien on debtor property to
secure its obligation under the credit.8 9 In Compton, the
86. Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d
586 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted, 835 F.2d 584 (1988).
87. American Bank of Martin County v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air
Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart), 845 F.2d 293 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, First
Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc. v. American Bank of Martin County, 488 U.S.
993 (1988).
88. 831 F.2d at 589; 845 F.2d at 295.
89. 831 F.2d at 589; 845 F.2d at 295.
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bankruptcy trustee successfully invoked sections 547 and 550 to
recover from the creditor the amount the creditor-beneficiary
had collected under the letter.9 The trustee did not attempt to
avoid the bank's lien. And while holding for the trustee against
the creditor, the court said in dictum that the issuing bank's
lien would not have been avoidable had the trustee attacked it.91
Thus the issuing bank was left with a secured claim in the
bankruptcy proceeding.
Air Conditioning was more complicated. After the debtor had
entered bankruptcy the beneficiary of the letter of credit
demanded payment from the issuing bank, and the bank filed
a complaint in the bankruptcy court accusing the beneficiary of
violating the automatic stay.Y The trustee intervened. At stake
was the $20,000 certificate of deposit the debtor had pledged to
the bank to secure the credit. The ultimate outcome was similar
to that in Compton. The trustee got the certificate of deposit;
the beneficiary got nothing; and the bank was not left with an
unsecured claim in bankruptcy. 9 The bankruptcy court had
"nullified" the letter of credit, negating the bank's obligation
to honor it.9
When the case was appealed to the district court, the New
York Clearinghouse Association entered a friend of the court
90. 831 F.2d at 592.
91. Id. at 591, 596.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
which initiates a bankruptcy case, stays, or, in effect, enjoins, all debt
collection activity by a debtor's creditors against the debtor or its property.
Compton and Air Conditioning both assumed, consistently with the holdings
of almost all the courts that have considered the point, that collecting under
a standby letter of credit is not a violation of the automatic stay because the
funds the beneficiary gets from the issuing bank are the bank's, not the
debtor's. Contra Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank of Tampa (In re Twist
Cap, Inc.), 1 Bankr. 284 (M.D. Fla. 1979). Once collected by the beneficiary
however, the funds may be recovered for the estate by the trustee, as
demonstrated in Compton and Air Conditioning.
93. 845 F.2d at 295.
94. American Bank of Martin County v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air
Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart), 55 Bankr. 157, 160 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Wendel (In re Air
Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart), 72 Bankr. 657 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. American Bank of Martin County v. Leasing Serv.
Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart), 845 F.2d 293 (1lth Cir. 1988).
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brief asking for reversal of the "nullification. '" 91 And
"nullification" was reversed by the district court.9 The district
court, however, awarded the certificate of deposit to the trustee,
as had the bankruptcy court.Y It acknowledged that its reversal
of "nullification" appeared to be a "revering of form over
substance," but said that the decision had the effect of giving
the beneficiary assurance of payment, but no assurance of
getting away with a preference.9 8 The court of appeals affirmed
this part of the district court decision." Thus the bank's duty
to pay under the credit was not undermined by the rationale
for decision as it would have been if the letter of credit had
been "nullified." But within the compressed circumstances of
the case, with all three parties in the same forum and the
certificate of deposit still in the issuing bank's possession, the
practical effect was the same whether the credit was "nullified"
or the payment upheld: the creditor wound up with nothing and
the bank had no further liability.
In Compton the bank had a fully secured claim; in Air
Conditioning the bank had no claim and no collateral but had
been able to use the pledged certificate to meet its letter of
credit obligation. Both cases thus protected the bank while
allowing recovery of the preference from the preferred creditor.
Both courts endorsed the two-transfer theory, applying it to a
single event-the debtor's granting of a lien to the bank.100 The
difference between the "two transfers" arising out of the single
event was that the transfer for the creditors' benefit was on
account of the antecedent debt, while the other transfer, to the
bank, was on account of the bank's contemporaneous (not
antecedent) extension of credit. Both courts emphasized that the
95. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Wendel (In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart),
72 Bankr. 657, 659 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
American Bank of Martin County v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Condi-
tioning, Inc. of Stuart), 845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, First Interstate
Credit Alliance, Inc. v. American Bank of Martin County, 488 U.S. 993
(1988).
96. 72 Bankr. at 663.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 662.
99. American Bank of Martin County v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air
Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart), 845 F.2d 293, 299 (lth Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at 298. See Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton
Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1987).
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"sanctity"'' of the letter of credit was thus respected; its
independence of the underlying transaction, and hence its
usefulness in commercial transactions, was thus preserved. Yet
the courts were able to give the trustee one recovery, against
the creditor, which is all the trustee is entitled to anyway. The
bankruptcy estate and letter of credit law both won; there were
no losers. And the two-transfer theory was the key.
The holdings in Compton and Air Conditioning, making the
creditors disgorge the proceeds of the letters of credit, are
undoubtedly correct. But the dicta about the inviolability of the
bank liens is questionable on two levels.
First, the cases overstate their success in protecting the
"sanctity" of letters of credit and preserving the independence
principle. Given what the courts actually held with respect to
recovery from the creditors, the practical effect of Compton
and Air Conditioning on letters of credit is not much different
from the effect the cases would have if they had also allowed
avoidance of the banks' liens as alternative remedies for the
trustees. A simple "one-transfer" approach avoiding the liens
would not have undercut letters of credit much more than did
the elaborate "seeing double" approach taken by the courts. In
other words, the elaborate metaphysics of the two-transfer theory
led to a relatively minor payoff in terms of preserving the utility
of letters of credit.
The second reason why the cases' dicta about the inviolability
of the issuing banks' liens is questionable is that the mystique
surrounding letters of credit in this situation is itself questionable:
why should banks issuing letters of credit be immune from laws
regulating the conduct of everyone else who deals with a
financially troubled firm that soon finds itself in bankruptcy?
Perhaps there is a compelling reason for such immunity, but its
existence should not be taken for granted.
Compton and Air Conditioning overstate the importance of
their results on protecting the "sanctity" of the independence
of letters of credit because the most important manifestation of
that "independence" is the separation of the underlying
transaction from the bank's duty to pay,10 and that independent
101. 845 F.2d at 299; 831 F.2d at 595.
102. The primary purpose of the letter of credit is to support an engage-
ment to pay money. Issuance of a letter of credit subsumes a separate
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duty to pay was not at stake in the cases. No matter what the
courts held or said in dicta about the banks' liens, the primary
principle of payment would not have been affected. That is, the
beneficiaries' right to draw under the credits and the banks'
duty to honor the credits were not directly threatened. At the
same time the actual holdings do undermine letters of credit
because their practical effect is to strip credits of their utility in
the context in which they were used in the litigated cases: what
the beneficiaries got from the banks they had to disgorge to the
trustees. So not much is really preserved; fewer such letters of
credit are apt to be issued on the eve of bankruptcy in the
future. The futility, from the creditor's point of view, of seeking
a letter of credit when the debtor is already in default and
heading towards bankruptcy should itself cause a decline in their
use in that setting. If the liens that banks took when issuing
such letters were vulnerable to the bankruptcy trustee,
undoubtedly even fewer such credits would ever actually be
issued. But the avoidability of the lien would only add to the
existing disincentive, given the probable futility of the device
from a creditor point of view.
The second reason why avoidance of an issuing bank's lien
is not a disaster, as seems to be implied by Cartage, is that it
is the right thing to do. Why should banks be encouraged to
collaborate with debtors and creditors who are trying to
accomplish last minute asset grabs and thus defeat bankruptcy's
collective process? Such banks may indeed already be vulnerable
arrangement under which one party has undertaken or proposes to un-
dertake an obligation to pay money to another party. By establishment
of a letter of credit, the issuer obligates himself to make payment to the
obligee for the account of the obligor. The obligation is direct and
primary, since it is not qualified by or dependent on performance or
nonperformance by anyone other than the issuer and his obligee; it is
independent, since it is exclusively defined by the terms of the letter of
credit.
H. HARFI , LEuTMRS OF CREDrr 1 (1979).
It is essential at the outset, however, to recognize the fundamental precept
of commercial credit banking, which is that the banker approaches the
mercantile transaction from the outside, remains on the outside, and is
bound and governed only by the contract which he himself makes and
not by the contract which the commercial parties may have made.
H. HAmFILD, BANK CREDrrs AND AccEPrTNcEs 28 (5th ed. 1974).
[Vol. 22
HeinOnline  -- 22 U. Tol. L. Rev. 278 1990-1991
INSIDER GUARANTIES
to the trustee, irrespective of section 547 and the two-transfer
theory, under fraudulent conveyance law. The letter of credit
situation has been usefully analogized to that which arose in the
famous old fraudulent conveyance case of Dean v. Davis.103 In
order to pacify a creditor threatening to report the debtor's
forgeries to law enforcement authorities, the debtor mortgaged
his assets to his brother-in-law who satisfied the threatening
creditor's claims. The brother-in-law had known what was taking
place. The threatening creditor was thereby preferred. When
debtor shortly thereafter went into bankruptcy, the brother-in-
law's mortgage on debtor's assets was avoided as a fraudulent
conveyance. 104
The effect of the transactions in Dean v. Davis is similar to
the effect that the letters of credit had on the debtors' estates
in Compton and Air Conditioning: an unsecured creditor was
paid, unencumbered assets became encumbered and no longer
available to meet general creditor claims, and no new value was
added to the debtor's estate. In Dean v. Davis the policy
vindicated was the fraudulent conveyance policy against transfers
made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud other
creditors.' ° Recovery against the brother-in-law depended on his
knowledge of the underlying realities with respect to the debtor's
situation, which meant he was not a purchaser in good faith.1°6
In Compton, the letter of credit stated on its face that it was
for an antecedent unsecured debt due to the beneficiary from
the bank's customer.° 7
A letter of credit issued with respect to already past due
antecedent debts is frequently a device to hold a pressing creditor
at bay (although the creditor may not so frequently be able to
threaten the debtor with jail, as in Dean v. Davis). There are
undoubtedly circumstances when a debtor can be given the
breathing space it needs to revive itself, if a pressing creditor
can be at least temporarily satisfied. But indiscriminate
encouragement of letters of credit in this situation is not a good
103. 242 U.S. 438 (1917). See Boshkoff, Does Anyone Remember Dean v.
Davis?, 1990 NORTON BANK. L. ADVISER 1 (1990); Nussbaum, supra note 84,
at 618.
104. 242 U.S. at 445.
105. Id. at 446.
106. Id.
107. 831 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1987).
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idea. Some will rescue viable debtors; others will themselves
precipitate involuntary bankruptcy petitions or lead to the added
expense of an avoidance proceeding in the debtor's eventual
bankruptcy. Therefore, despite the relatively mechanical operation
of today's preference law under section 547, as contrasted with
the more subjective case-by-case analysis that was possible under
the subjective "actual fraud" test used in Dean v. Davis, a rule
defeating an issuing bank's mortgage on debtor property is not
inherently unsound.
If rejection of the two-transfer theory automatically leads to
the conclusion that banks will lose their liens if they issue letters
of credit that are substitutes for direct preferences, then banks
will have to make sufficient inquiry about the purpose and the
current or past due status of the customer obligation they are
backing up in order to stay out of that line of newly dangerous
business. But why is this too onerous? Banks issuing non-standby
credits presumably take into account that they will be secured
if they honor drafts accompanied by negotiable documents. Such
weighing of the relative perils or relative security of their
undertakings is already part of banking practice, or should be.
It is not too much to expect that banks find out whether their
customers are already in default before issuing stand-by letters.
If Cartage makes banks more cautious in that respect, the overall
extra costs to the banking business are not necessarily any greater
than the benefits to be gained by eliminating the costs of
avoiding preferences in the bankruptcy process.
B. Implications For Fully Secured Creditors
Cartage itself is a case in which a bankruptcy trustee recovered
preferences from a creditor that the court treated as fully
secured. 1°8 But the case is not an important precedent on such
recovery. For Cartage was a special "fully secured creditor"
case: the collateral that secured the creditor's claim did not
belong to the debtor. The certificates of deposit that were
pledged to City Bank were owned by Della Foster. 1°9 This
108. City Bank in fact was probably not fully secured because it apparently
did not receive all the certificates of deposit it anticipated, and its security
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atypical fact had significance in two ways: 1) even if there had
been no insider guaranty, payments (those within ninety days
before bankruptcy) made to City Bank would have been
avoidable; and 2) the payments arguably "benefitted" the Foster
insiders only because Della Foster, not C-L Cartage, owned the
collateral.
The reason that City Bank, even though "fully secured,"
would have been vulnerable to preference attack is that payments
to it would have depleted the debtor's estate, while payments
to a fully secured creditor whose collateral is owned by the
debtor do not: in that situation, every dollar paid increases the
debtor's equity in the collateral." 0 But if the debtor does not
own the collateral, every dollar paid is simply a dollar less in
the estate. In statutory terms, payments to a fully secured
creditor whose collateral does not belong to the debtor satisfy
section 547(b)(5) (the part of the subsection that ordinarily
insulates fully secured creditors from avoidance) because the
recipient does receive more on account of the payment than it
would receive, in the words of section 547(b)(5), "under the
provisions of this title"; if the fully secured creditor whose
collateral belongs to a third party were not paid before
bankruptcy, it would have to foreclose outside of bankruptcy
to take advantage of its "fully secured" status, but it might get
nothing from "the provisions of this title," which means the
bankruptcy liquidation itself."'
Della Foster's ownership of the collateral was also critical to
the trustee's entire insider preference avoidance case, although
the court never explicitly worked the fact into its analysis. If
C-L Cartage (not Della Foster) had owned the collateral and if
City Bank had been fully secured by the debtor-owned collateral,
it is arguable that none of the payments made to City Bank
before bankruptcy would have been avoidable. The reason for
nonavoidability vis-d-vis the Foster insiders would be that
payments to City Bank would not have benefitted them, because
if the collateral fully secured the claim, then the Fosters would
have had no exposure to potential liability, despite their guaranty.
110. See Herman Cantor Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank (In re Herman
Cantor Corp.), 15 Bankr. 747, 749 (E.D. Va. 1981); Mazer v. Aetna Fin. Co.
(In re Zuni), 6 Bankr. 449, 451-52 (D.N.M. 1980).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988).
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Therefore, they would have been no better off on account of
the payments, or, in statutory terms, would have received no
"benefit" by reason of the transfers." 2 City Bank for its part
could have successfully resisted avoidance if it were fully secured
by debtor-owned collateral under the normal operation of section
547(b)(5). The ownership of the collateral by Della Foster was
thus an important fact to which, as indicated above, the Sixth
Circuit never alluded in its analyses of the issues; the court's
actual handling of the issues, however, did give the atypical
ownership circumstance its appropriate significance.
While Cartage's unusual facts mean that its own holding with
respect to preference recovery from a "fully secured" creditor
is not of large importance, rejection of the two-transfer theory
has been said to have implications for at least one situation
involving an "ordinary" fully secured creditor whose collateral
is owned by the debtor."' And while the affected secured party
is "ordinary" in that its collateral is owned by the debtor, the
circumstances in which rejection of the two-transfer theory
probably could have its most baleful effect are hardly common.
Suppose a fully secured creditor's collateral is also subject to
a junior lien that is undersecured. When such a fully secured
creditor receives payments that reduce its lien, the junior
undersecured creditor with an interest in the same collateral
steps up dollar for dollar into the secured status no longer
needed by the senior lender. For example, if debtor's farm
worth $1,000,000 secures an obligation to Bank One in the
amount of $800,000 and an obligation to Bank Two in the
amount of $500,000, a $100,000 payment to Bank One will
make an additional $100,000 worth of the farm available to
secure Bank Two's claim. Instead of being undersecured by
$300,000, Bank Two has become undersecured by only $200,000.
Bank Two is better off because of the transfer. If Debtor's
trustee argued that the transfer to Bank One was for the benefit
of Bank Two, and therefore was avoidable and recoverable not
112. See In re Deprizio, 874 F.2d 1186, 1199 (7th Cir. 1989).
113. Katzen, supra note 53, at 535. The issue was presented in Deprizio.
The Seventh Circuit remanded because it had not been considered in the courts
below. Its dismissive comment on remanding, that "[t]he benefit in such a
case is negligible at best, so the case for recapture is weak," seems to need
elucidation, which the court did not supply. 874 F.2d at 1200. See Katzen,
supra note 53, at 521.
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only from Bank Two but also from fully secured Bank One, a
two-transfer analysis would defeat the trustee. By analyzing the
transfer twice, a court could reach the desired goal of avoiding
$100,000 worth of Bank Two's lien, while also reaching the
desired goal of protecting Bank One because with respect to
Bank One, the creditor to which the transfer was made, section
547(b)(5) (on net gain) would not be satisfied.
If this case arose, the availability to Bank One of the two-
transfer theory would clearly be convenient; but it would not
be indispensable. For even if the trustee could recover $100,000
from Bank One, normal bankruptcy practice would seem to
dictate that Bank One get back its claim against the estate, and
"claim" in this situation should clearly mean a $100,000 "secured
claim." The avoidance exercise, if the trustee went through with
it, would annoy Bank One, but if the collateral were still worth
$1,000,000, Bank One, with its fully secured status in the
bankruptcy proceeding, would theoretically be no worse off than
if the trustee had ignored it.
A much more threatening situation, but hardly a common
one, arises if it is impossible to restore Bank One to its former
"fully secured" status in exchange for its return of the avoided
transfer. For example, suppose that debtor pays off both Bank
One and Bank Two. (A $300,000 preference to Bank Two would
have occurred and should be recoverable from Bank Two, but
not from Bank One if its fully secured status is really to mean
what everyone wants it to mean.) Then debtor borrows $1,000,000
from Bank Three and grants Bank Three a mortgage on the
farm. Now, since it is impossible to restore to Bank One its
fully secured claim, the avoidance and recovery of $300,000
from Bank One would not be just annoying, but catastrophic.
But again, the two-transfer theory would rescue Bank One." 4
114. If the collateral is personal property it may be possible for the secured
party (Bank One) to avert the worst case situation. Bank One might insist
upon maintaining its Article Nine financing statement on file until after the
preference reach back period has expired. Ordinarily if there is no debt to be
secured, a debtor can require a former creditor such as Bank One to submit
a termination statement for filing, and thus relinquish its first place in the
line of priority with respect to specific collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-404 (1990).
But given the bankruptcy vulnerability this might cause to Bank One, a
respectable argument could be made by Bank One that it is subject to an
(involuntary) "commitment to incur obligations" and therefore not subject to
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Is the two-transfer theory then indispensable, and are Cartage,
Deprizio and other cases rejecting it wrong, or at least
questionable? Is it needed to prevent catastrophe? The answer,
it is submitted, is "no," because the trustee's preference case
against Bank One can be defeated (while its case against Bank
Two succeeds) without contradicting the rationale in Cartage.
This goal can be achieved through an analysis of the facts in
Cartage, and in the Bank One-Two-Three hypothetical, which
focuses on the words "antecedent debt" in section 547(b)(2). In
Cartage there was only one debt, of $50,000. By contrast, in
the hypothetical, debtor owes two distinct and different antecedent
debts, one to Bank One, and the other to Bank Two. Suppose
debtor pays $100,000 to Bank One. A transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property (cash) to Bank One has obviously occurred.
But so has a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
(its interest in the farm) to Bank Two occurred. Neither transfer
was for the benefit of anyone else. There is no need to resort
to the words "or for the benefit of" in section 547(b)(1). Two
transfers occurred. Each was to a creditor. Each was on account
of a different antecedent debt. Neither was literally "for the
benefit of" anyone else. Each transfer can be analyzed separately.
The transfer to Bank One was "on account of" the debt to
Bank One; the transfer to Bank Two was "on account of" the
debt to Bank Two. Just as Cartage insisted on focusing on a
single creditor throughout a section 547(b) analysis, so this
analysis focuses on a single debt. The transfer to Bank Two is
avoidable and recoverable from Bank Two; it is not recoverable
from Bank One because the transfer of the mortgage interest to
Bank Two was neither to nor for the benefit of Bank One. The
transfer to Bank One is not avoidable and not recoverable at
all.
the § 9-404 duty to submit a termination statement. Id. If a financing statement
remained on file, Bank Three, even though it loaned when no debt was owed
to Bank One, could not attain higher priority on account of the "first to
file" rule of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. § 9-312(5)(a). Thus, if Bank
One's financing statement were still of record, even if Bank One were forced
to disgorge the payment to it as preferential, the bankruptcy court could
replace the funds with a first lien of equal value. Even this might not be
feasible, however, if the collateral itself had ceased to exist. Nor is it fully
satisfactory to recommend that first lienors forbid debtors to grant second
mortgages. Debtors might do so anyway.
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Is this interpretive method just the two-transfer theory coming
in by the back door? Perhaps one can put it that way, and it
is obviously result driven. But it is hardly "tortured." Focusing
on which particular debt a transfer is "for or on account of"
limits the "for the benefit of" words to the situation for which
they were intended: a three cornered debt involving a principal
obligor, a surety, and a creditor. That was the situation in
Cartage in which a single transfer did in fact go to one creditor
and, with respect to the same debt, benefit another creditor. If
seeing two transfers is seeing double in the Cartage situation,
perhaps it is myopic not to see two transfers when two different
"interests in property" are used to affect two separate debts,
owed to two unrelated creditors. This is what happens in the
hypothetical. It does not happen in Cartage. It would appear
therefore that Cartage does not threaten the position of
oversecured creditors.
VII. TlE IMPACT OF CARTAGE AND FNN ON INSIDER
GUARANTY CASES
Cartage's significance for lenders who take insider guaranties
is in part a function of the significance of preference law in
general. If a transfer cannot be avoided under section 547, there
is no one from whom the trustee can recover under section 550,
no matter what the reach back period may be. The Seventh
Circuit made this point when it predicted in Deprizio that the
case would have minor consequences. ' 5 In Cartage the Sixth
Circuit made no predictions, but within a few months it decided
another section 547 case, In re Finn,'16 in which it interpreted
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984"7 in a way as beneficial to lenders as Cartage appears to
be detrimental. Finn, together with an earlier case, In re
Fulghum,"8 took a large number of transfers on account of
antecedent debts out of reach of the trustee's preference avoiding
power. Indeed, were the events in Cartage to repeat themselves
115. 874 F.2d 1186, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1989).
116. 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990).
117. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
118. 872 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1989).
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now (the case was filed before the effective date of the 1984
amendments)," 9 the result would likely be different.
In Finn the debtor obtained a consolidation loan in order to
pay several already existing debts. Her brother co-signed. During
the next year debtor made regularly scheduled monthly payments
on the loan totalling $1300. Then she filed a bankruptcy petition.
The trustee sought recovery of the $1300 from her brother, an
insider benefitted by the repayments. The brother claimed the
transfers were excepted from avoidance as "ordinary course"
payments under section 547(c)(2).120 In the bankruptcy court and
district court the trustee prevailed. 121 Both lower courts held as
a matter of law that section 547(c)(2) never applied to long term
debt. The Sixth Circuit reversed.
Finn read the post-1984 text of section 547(c)(2) literally and
held that it applied not only to trade credit or other similarly
short term obligations, as did the pre-1984 version, but also
applied to long term debt, provided the "ordinary course"
requirements were satisfied. 22 Before 1984, the section 547(c)(2)
exception was limited to repayment of debt incurred within
forty-five days before the repayment was made. 23 When the
forty-five day provision was dropped in 1984,124 some courts
119. The 1984 amendments to § 547(c)(2) are only applicable to cases filed
on or after October 9, 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 553(a), 98 Stat. 333, 392
(1984).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988).
121. 86 Bankr. 902, 907 (E.D. Mich. 1988); 111 Bankr. 123, 131 (E.D.
Mich. 1989), rev'd, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990).
122. 909 F.2d at 906.
123. Prior to the 1984 amendments, § 547(c)(2) read as follows:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(2) to the extent such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business
or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547(c)(2), 92 Stat.
2549, 2598 (amended 1984).
124. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
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and commentators said the effect of the amendment was limited
to expanding the exception to cover essentially recent, short
term obligations, even if their billing cycle were somewhat more
than forty-five days. 125 Much of the case law under the old
version had focused on how to compute the forty-five day
period; and long term lenders had had nothing to do with
lobbying for the amendment. 126 Finn rejected a narrow reading
of the new text based on that history.
In remanding for the "peculiarly factual' ' t27 inquiry called for
with respect to section 547(c)(2), the Sixth Circuit endorsed
Congress' description of what preference law was intended to
avoid: "unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors
during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy."' 128 And the court
added that even if the transaction were the first one entered
into between the debtor and the creditor, it might qualify for
ordinary course treatment; it depended on whether what was
done was normal for a person in debtor's position.
125. See Ragsdale v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank (In re Control Elec.,
Inc.), 91 Bankr. 1010, 1013 (N.D. Ga. 1988); McCullough v. Garland (In re
Jackson), 90 Bankr. 793, 797 (D.S.C. 1988); McClanahan v. Lakeside Nat'l
Bank (In re RDC Corp.), 88 Bankr. 97, 100 (W.D. La. 1988); Aguillard v.
Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 Bankr. 657, 659-60 (W.D. La. 1986).
Contra Rinn v. MTA Employees Credit Union (In re Butler), 85 Bankr. 34,
36 (D. Md. 1988). See also Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable
Preferences: The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 78, 81 (1987); Note, Timing of Payments by Check Under Section 547
of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 CAiuDozo L. REv. 887, 904-05 (1986). Contra
Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy A mend-
ments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 91, 122 (1985); Herbert, The
Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor II: The 1984 Amendment to Section 547(c)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 2 BAKR. DE . J. 201, 212-19 (1985); DeSimone,
Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Ordinary Course of Business
Exception Without the 45 Day Rule, 20 AKRON L. REv. 95, 112 (1986);
Weintraub & Resnick, Preferential Payment of Long-Term Debts in the
Ordinary Course of Business- The Effect of the 1984 Amendments, 17 U.C.C.
L.J. 263, 265-66 (1985).
126. See Ragsdale v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, Inc. (In re Control
Elec., Inc.), 91 Bankr. 1010, 1013 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
127. 909 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.,
872 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1989)).
128. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 337, 373-74, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhMN. NEws 5963, 6329.
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The court had made the same point about unusual action in
Fulghum, a case in which it held that "ordinary course" meant
what was ordinary between the debtor and the creditor.
The focus of this court's inquiry must be directed to an analysis
of the business practices which were unique to the particular
parties under consideration and not to the practices which gen-
erally prevailed in the industry of the parties. Even if the debtor's
business transactions were irregular, they may be considered "or-
dinary" for purposes of § 547(c)(2) if those transactions were
consistent with the course of dealings between the particular
parties. 129
Fulghum held that section 547(c)(2) excepted from avoidance a
transfer that arose from one of about a hundred short term
loans incurred and repaid to a related firm to enable the debtor,
a construction company, to meet its cash flow requirements
when its own customers were slow to pay. 30
Finn did not reject Fulghum, but added its own dimension to
the meaning of "ordinary course." Thus "ordinary course" can
mean either ordinary between the parties (Fulghum) or ordinary
in an objective sense based on what is typical for an industry
or for a consumer (Finn). Most importantly however, under
Finn repayments of long term debt, debt that is quintessentially
antecedent, can be excepted from avoidance under either of
these two different meanings of "ordinary course."
While lenders defending preference cases within this favorable
legal framework will nevertheless have the burden of proving13 1
that their debt and its repayment 32 were "ordinary" and not
''unusual action" taken during a "slide into bankruptcy," many
129. 872 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing In re White, 58 Bankr. 266,
270 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)).
130. Id. at 745.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988) states that "the creditor or party in interest
against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the
nonavoidability of that transfer under subsection (c) of this section."
132. The first requirement of § 547(c)(2) is that the debt be "incurred in
the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee." Id. § 547(c)(2)(A). The second requirement of § 547(c)(2) is that
the payment of the debt be "made in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee." Id. § 547(c)(2)(C).
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should succeed in doing so. As indicated, the lender in Cartage
might well have been able to defeat the trustee had the case
been filed a few months later, and even the Deprizio result
might have been different had the case been filed later.
This may indicate that Cartage's impact will be least upon
creditors with the least need for an insider guaranty, and it will
be greatest on creditors who need an insider guaranty most. For
the transaction apparently safest from avoidance under section
547(c)(2) is one entered into at a time when the debtor is healthy
financially, and in which repayments are kept on schedule up
to the time that a bankruptcy petition is filed.' Taking an
insider guaranty at the time such a loan is made will not itself
expose a lender to section 547 problems. Then as time passes if
the debtor's condition deteriorates it may help assure that the
loan repayment schedule is followed. That is, the more the
insider guaranty "works" by causing pressure on the debtor,
through the insider, to use debtor's assets to repay the lender
with the guaranty, the less irregular and more "ordinary" the
repayments of guarantied long term debt will probably appear
to be. Whether they are really "business as usual" or business
under the gun of the guaranty will be difficult to discern. 34
133. If the debtor is financially healthy when the debt is incurred there is
less chance that the court can find facts supporting a conclusion that the debt
was incurred outside the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee. Likewise, if the debt is repayed in a regular
and timely fashion there is a greater chance that the court will determine that
the payment was made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee. See, e.g., Rinn v. MTA Employees Credit
Union (In re Butler), 85 Bankr. 34, 36 (D. Md. 1988) (Where a long term
unsecured loan is entered into by a credit union's customer and regular
repayment is assured through the use of a wage withholding agreement, the
debt will be said to be in the ordinary course.); Sims Office Supply, Inc. v.
Ka-D-Ka, Inc. (In re Sims Office Supply, Inc.), 94 Bankr. 744, 750 (M.D.
Fla. 1988) (Where transferee sold all the assets of its business to debtor in
exchange for three promissory notes, and debtor made regular payments
pursuant to the Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement for approximately three
and one-half years prior to the preference period and then throughout the
preference period, the court held the payments were within the ordinary course
exception and therefore not avoidable by the trustee.).
134. Paying some creditors and not others is not automatically outside the
ordinary course of business, so long as the debtor's collapse is not imminent
and it is not known that other creditors will be left unpaid at bankruptcy.
See Newton v. Andrews Distrib. Co. (In re White), 64 Bankr. 843, 851 (E.D.
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And the trustee's possible argument that a debtor should have
been less regular in its payments (given its failing circumstances)
seems a difficult argument to make.
At the other end of the safety spectrum, the unsafe-to-lenders
end, are creditors who enter the picture or add new money
during troubled times 3 5 that may later be characterized by a
trustee and court as "the slide into bankruptcy.' 36 These creditors
presumably need guaranties more than creditors dealing with
better risk borrowers. For these creditors however, an insider
guaranty may be a guaranty of a one year reach back period.
This might indicate that Cartage's biggest impact may be felt
in "workout" situations, when a debtor in financial trouble and
its creditors attempt to compromise their interests and together
make the best of a bad situation. Were this "out-of-court
bankruptcy" to devolve later, after it had failed, into a real
bankruptcy proceeding, the availability of section 547(c)(2) would
seem problematical because workouts are unusual in themselves,
and deals struck during them in an attempt to salvage a situation
are not like loan transactions entered into by wholly voluntary
Tenn. 1986). The ordinary course payment in White was made in mid-January,
when other creditors were not being paid. The bankruptcy petition was filed
in mid-March.
135. If the creditor is aware of the deteriorating financial condition of the
debtor, any action the creditor takes may be characterized as a prohibited
"grab of assets." Staats v. Branham Sign Co. (In re Circleville Distrib. Co.),
84 Bankr. 502, 504-05 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (citing Production Steel, Inc. v.
Sumitomo Corp. of Am. (In re Production Steel, Inc.), 54 Bankr. 417 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985)). In Circleville Distrib., the bankruptcy court listed the creditor's
awareness of the debtor's deteriorating financial condition as a factor in
determining whether a transaction was made in the ordinary course of business.
Contra Storey v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (In re Cook United, Inc.), 117
Bankr. 884, 887-89 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
136. J.P. Fyfe, Inc. of Florida v. Bradas Supply Corp. (In re J.P. Fyfe,
Inc. of Florida), 96 Bankr. 474, 477 (D.N.J. 1988) (Supplier who suspended
indefinitely debtor's antecedent debt during debtor's time of difficulty, but
who continued to supply debtor with new supplies under a new payment
agreement, was considered to possess debt falling outside the ordinary course
of business.); Ragsdale v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank (In re Control
Elec.), 91 Bankr. 1010, 1013 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (A subcontractor who took out
a loan to be used as long term working capital in order to pay off trade
creditors in a timely fashion did not fall within the ordinary course of business
exception, even though repayments were timely due to an agreement between
debtor and bank that bank would automatically debit debtor's checking
account.).
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participants. 37 Hence the insider guaranty would seem most
vulnerable in that setting.
However, even this bleak outlook may be too pessimistic,
given the facts in both Finn and Fulghum, because in both cases
the debtor was in some degree of trouble when it took out the
loans that the Sixth Circuit decided were ordinary course
transactions. In Finn, the debt arose from a consolidation loan,
which is rarely an advisable loan for a debtor in good financial
condition to take out; the giving of the brother's guaranty may
also have reflected the creditor's special lack of confidence in
the debtor. 138 In Fulghum, the debtor had cash flow problems.
Yet in neither case is there any indication that the transaction
was automatically disqualified from section 547(c)(2) treatment
by reason of these difficulties. In fact in Fulghum the court
stated:
This court declines to discourage transactions of the type here at
issue, which were a paradigmatic example of the type of trans-
action promoted by § 547(c). The primary purpose of that section
was to encourage "short term credit dealing[s] with troubled
debtors in order to forestall bankruptcy." [The] § 547(c)(2) ex-
ception is designed to encourage creditors to conduct business
with a struggling enterprise so that debtors can rehabilitate them-
selves. 39
Speculation about the extent of the section 547(c)(2) exception
and its effect on guaranties will continue until the Sixth Circuit
137. Congress has stated the policy behind preference law is to "discourage
unusual action by either the debtor or his creditor during the debtor's slide
into bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373-74 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMNi. NEWS 5963, 6329. The courts
take a dim view of a change in dealing which is initiated by a creditor. In
Gull Air, Inc. v. Beech Acceptance Corp. (In re Gull Air, Inc.), 82 Bankr. 1
(D. Mass. 1988), where the workout occurred in response to the creditor's
coercive action in filing a lawsuit, the court determined that payment under
a workout falls outside the ordinary course of business exception. Contra In
re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 Bankr. 269 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Armstrong
v. John Deere Co. (In re Gilbertson), 90 Bankr. 1006 (D.N.D. 1988).
138. 909 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1990). Another less significant reason
might be to angle for better treatment in a potential chapter 13 case; a creditor
holding a claim guarantied by an insider can qualify for better treatment in
a debtor's chapter 13 plan than other creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (1988).
139. 872 F.2d 739, 744 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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decides more cases on what "ordinary course" means for the
incurring and repaying of debt by a failing firm. Is adherence
to an installment payment schedule "ordinary course" if other
debts are not being paid on time?140 If nothing is being paid on
time, does "chronically late" become "ordinary course" for a
particular debtor? 4'
While these issues were in a sense before the courts in the
past, Finn really creates a new area of judicial inquiry because
it applies the section 547(c)(2) exception to long term as well as
short term debt. This new field of inquiry, however, is
disconnected from real policy moorings because allowing long
term debt to qualify for exception on essentially "procedural"
grounds (i.e. the regularity of its payment or whatever it takes
to be in the "ordinary course") has nothing to do with protecting
the eventual collective insolvency proceeding from being undercut
by creditors who can escape from it by keeping what they get
before it begins.
The reason for the original section 547(c)(2) exception was
that it did not undermine the collective process for a short term
creditor who had just put value into the asset pool, value that
kept the debtor in business, to take it right back out again. The
net result was neither a gain nor a loss for the other creditors.
The "ordinary course" standards as applied to this short term
debt were a prudential mechanism to assure that non-typical
short term creditors did not get a chance to take advantage of
140. Newton v. Andrews Distrib. Co. (In re White), 64 Bankr. 843, 851
(E.D. Tenn. 1986), suggests that even a finding that the debtor has paid
certain creditors on a relatively timely basis but has been substantially late or
in default with respect to other creditors will not preclude a finding that the
payment on the debt that has been paid in a relatively timely fashion has
been made in the ordinary course.
141. Where the White court found that the debtor regularly made late
payments, ranging from a few days to approximately thirty days late, payment
that was only about two weeks late was held to be made in the ordinary
course of business and according to ordinary business terms. Id. at 849-51.
However, some courts take a very strict position against allowing late payments
within the ordinary course of business, and therefore it is unlikely that paying
chronically late will become the ordinary course in these courts. See, e.g.,
Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1567-68
(11th Cir. 1986) ("Lateness is particularly relevant in determining whether
payments should be protected by the ordinary course of business exception....
Thus, untimely payments are more likely to be considered outside the ordinary
course of business and avoidable as preferences.").
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an exception not intended for them. 42 To keep only those
procedural safeguards, couched in ordinary course terms, while
radically changing the context in which they are to be applied,
does not make sense. There is no policy reason for letting long
term lenders be preferred. A rule that invites them to take
preferences undercuts the whole deterrent effect that preference
law is intended to have. 43 Indeed, whatever the ultimate
boundaries of "ordinary course" turn out to be for long term
debt repayments, prudent and well advised debtors and creditors
with insider guaranties will be able to adjust their behavior to
meet those standards and thus maximize their chances for escaping
the trustee's section 547 avoidance power. Fine tuning control
over the debtor's behavior will not only mean getting paid before
bankruptcy begins, but also having the best chance of keeping
what has already been received outside the collective proceeding.
This strange effect of Finn on the Cartage situation comes
about because while the 1984 amendment to section 547(c)(2) in
one sense freed the courts from the arbitrariness of the forty-
five day "rule" and substituted for that relatively inflexible
"rule" a standard of conduct ("ordinary course"), the standard
all by itself has no particular bearing on the purposes of
preference law and the reasons for exceptions from it. The
courts were left free to exercise the kind of case by case,
"particularly factual," inquiry that courts are good at. But
Congress forgot that the benefit it was giving to ordinary course
creditors in section 547(c)(2) was supposed to be contingent on
a recent benefit to the debtor's estate. Instead, people who
figure out how to stay on the right side of an "ordinary course"
demarcation line stand to get a benefit they do not deserve
because they have not paid for it with a recent infusion of funds
into a failing debtor.
142. Professor Duncan argues that the distinction made should not be short
term versus long term debt, but rather should be typical versus atypical
transaction. Duncan, Loan Payments to Secured Creditors as Preferences
Under the 1984 Amendments, 64 NEB. L. Rv. 83, 89-91 (1985).
143. Ragsdale v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank (In re Control Elec., Inc.),
91 Bankr. 1010 (N.D. Ga. 1988), where the court noted that the elimination
of the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement shifted congressional focus
from a subjective view to an objective view, which in turn shifted the policy
focus away from deterrence and "toward equality of distribution." Id. at
1051. But the point of deterrence, of course, is equality of distribution in a
collective proceeding.
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The Sixth Circuit's decisions in Cartage and Finn are not to
blame for this state of the law. Cartage in fact interpreted the
Bankruptcy Code as written by Congress in a way that advances
bankruptcy policy on a point that Congress in all probability
did not actually contemplate when it wrote the law. In Cartage
the precision with which the Bankruptcy Code was drafted paid
off, perhaps accidentally, with a result consistent with underlying
bankruptcy policy. Finn, however, exposes the dangers of a
code written in terms of "rules" instead of "standards." The
section 547(c)(2) exception was intended for repayments made
on not-quite-contemporaneous debts. But instead of drafting
toward that idea or that "standard," Congress originally wrote
a "rule" in terms of forty-five-day old debts. That was too
precise. It excluded too many debts that were probably intended
to be covered, and it led to too much litigation. The new rule
is in one sense just as precise as the old one: no matter how
many days or years old a debt may be, it is still within the
scope of possible exception under section 547(c)(2). Both "rules"
were supplemented by ordinary course standards for the courts
to develop. But the new "unlimited" day rule of the post-1984
amendment to section 547(c)(2) makes the courts' task very
difficult to accomplish in a meaningful way.
VIII. LENDER RELIEF FROM CARTAGE
A. The Non-solution
Initially it should be noted that the most frequently suggested
antidote for the one year reach back period on insider guarantied
loans will almost certainly not work. That suggestion is
renunciation by the insider of its claim for reimbursement against
the debtor.'4 If this right of subrogation were waived, and if
the loan then had to be repaid by the insider, the insider would
have no claim against the debtor for the amount it had paid on
the debtor's behalf. Since the insider would never have had even
144. See Baker, Repayments of Loans Guarantied by Insiders as Avoidable
Preferences in Bankruptcy: Deprizio and Its Aftermath, 23 U.C.C. L.J. 115
(1990); Nussbaum, supra note 84; Zaretsky, Indirect Preferences Pose New
Risk To Noninsiders and Secured Creditors, 1989-90 CoM. LENDING REv. 46
(1990).
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a contingent claim against the debtor, it would not be a
"creditor." Payments on the loan under these circumstances
would be to the outsider-creditor, but would not be for the
benefit of an insider-creditor, because the insider would not be
a creditor at all. Hence payments to the lender would not be
avoidable preferences with respect to the insider, and the standard
ninety day reach back period of section 547 would apply with
respect to the outside-lender.
This idea has been thoroughly discussed, and demolished,
elsewhere:
The exclusive focus on the insider guarantor's preference exposure
incorrectly assumes that, if the insider can successfully avoid
classification as a creditor, any benefit the insider receives from
the insolvent corporation's payment of a guarantied debt will fall
into a gaping black hole in the Bankruptcy Code from which it
cannot be retrieved by the bankruptcy trustee. In short, the
proponents of the subrogation waiver ... have forgotten all about
the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 4
Waiver by the insider of its right to be subrogated to the
outsider-lender's claim against the debtor will cause fraudulent
conveyance problems because were the debtor to use its assets
to pay the guarantied debt and thus reduce the insider's liability,
the insider would benefit from that transaction even more than
it would benefit were the debtor to pay a guarantied debt on
which the guarantor had not waived its subrogation rights. The
difference between the benefits to the insider-guarantor in the
two transactions is akin to a dividend to the insider. Because
debtor is insolvent the dividend is tantamount to a give-away
of debtor assets to the insider.'4 Giving away assets while
145. Borowitz, supra note 4, at 2156.
146. Borowitz explains it in terms of a stockholder/guarantor:
[Wihen the bank requires, as a lending condition, that the stockholder/
guarantor waive his subrogation rights, the bank is creating an asset for
the corporation's estate, which the corporation may subsequently discard
only at the peril of the stockholder and his subsequent transferee, the
bank. After all, so long as the stockholder is fully exposed under its
guaranty to the bank and has no claim back against the corporation, the
corporation should at the very least be able to bargain persuasively with
the stockholder over how much each should contribute to repay the bank.
Any gratuitous surrender of that bargaining power by an insolvent cor-
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insolvent is a fraudulent conveyance. 47 Fraudulent conveyances
are avoidable in bankruptcy under both section 548'" of the
Bankruptcy Code and under state fraudulent conveyance law,
which the trustee can invoke via section 544(b).'49 The reach
back period for fraudulent conveyances under section 548 is one
year.150 The reach back period for fraudulent conveyances under
state law is typically much longer."' The insider's renunciation
of its rights against the debtor, which turns the trustee's preference
case into a fraudulent conveyance case, thus makes matters even
worse for the outsider lender.
B. Limited Relief: Section 550(b)
If waiving subrogation rights will not be effective, what can
lenders do to minimize preference exposure if their loan is
guarantied by an insider? In Cartage three of the ten avoided
transfers were made to Della Foster, who endorsed the payment
checks over to the bank, and seven were made directly to the
bank. The Sixth Circuit held that the bank was liable to the
trustee for the seven direct payments (on which it was "initial
transferee") but could retain the other three (which it took as
"immediate transferee" from Della Foster) if it could establish,
on remand, the section 550(b) defense that it took them "for
value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or an
poration would appear to constitute a transfer of an intangible asset by
the corporation to the stockholder without any fair consideration in
exchange therefor. Any such transfer of net worth from corporation to
stockholder is again tantamount to a dividend or stock redemption and
is equally subject to fraudulent conveyance attack.
Id. at 2162-63.
147. Bankruptcy law describes such a "fraudulent transfer" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2)(A)-(B)(i) (1988).
148. The power to avoid "fraudulent transfers and obligations" under §
548 is another one of the trustee's avoiding powers. Id. § 548.
149. Section 544(b) provides in part: "The trustee may avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured
claim . . . ." Id. § 544(b). The reference to "applicable law" includes state
fraudulent conveyance or transfer law.
150. Id. § 548(a).
151. For example, Ohio has a four year reach back period. OQo REVED
CODE ANN. § 1336.09 (Baldwin 1989).
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antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the
voidability of the transfer avoided."'5
2
Thus the most obvious lender technique in the Sixth Circuit
to minimize insider preference problems is to structure the loan
and particularly loan repayments so that repayments reach the
lender indirectly, possibly via the insider. As indicated below
however, the defense will probably be most valuable and perhaps
only of value to lenders dealing with parties similar to those in
the Cartage case: a debtor firm with no real credit of its own,
controlled however by insiders who do have respectable credit.
To establish the section 550(b) defense a lender would have
to demonstrate
a) that it was an immediate or mediate (not "initial") transferee
of the preference from the debtor;
b) that it took for value;
c) that it took in good faith;"' and
d) that it took without knowledge of voidability.'5 4
The Cartage remand establishes that a lender can attain
"immediate transferee" status by lending to the insider, on
152. 899 F.2d 1490, 1493-94 (6th Cir. 1990).
153. There is a weak inference to be drawn from the legislative history of
§ 550 that the deliberate diversion of funds on their way to a subsequent
transferee might be an indication of bad faith. "The phrase 'good faith' in
this paragraph is intended to prevent a transferee from whom the trustee could
recover from transferring the recoverable property to an innocent transferee,
and receiving a retransfer from him, that is, 'washing' the transaction through
an innocent third party." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & ADmN. NEws 5787, 6332.
The "laundering" described in the House Report, however, is not the same
as the two-step repayment process suggested by the Cartage remand. "Wash-
ing" a transfer is bad faith according to the congressional history only if the
eventual transferee had been more vulnerable to recovery at an earlier stage,
and attempted to overcome that disability by two more transfers. The "good
faith" requirement on which the passage seems to focus is that in § 550(b)(2),
which shields from liability all subsequent transferees after the first § 550(b)(1)
transferee "without knowledge." See Eder v. Queen City Grain Co. (In re
Queen City Grain, Inc.), 51 Bankr. 722, 727 (S.D. Ohio 1985). It means
someone "with knowledge" may not improve its position against the trustee
by retaking from an innocent transferee. This is not what happened in Cartage.
Nor is there any reason to believe that doing deliberately all of the time what
the parties did three times out of ten in Cartage would constitute bad faith.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988).
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paper, and then collecting from the "debtor" via the insider.
In Cartage, however, the form of this transaction was actually
true to its substance because, from the bank's credit-judgment
perspective, the Fosters really were the borrowers. They
(particularly Della) had credit; the Cartage firm did not. Lending
to them, and formally ignoring the firm, was consistent with
the bank's view of credit reality. Whether a lender could attain
"immediate transferee" status if it attempted to duplicate the
form of the Cartage arrangement in a situation in which the
"real" borrower (that is, the entity with real credit) was the
firm and the insiders were, or would become, insolvent if they
performed their guaranty, is somewhat problematical, as described
below. More importantly, the harder the lender seemed to be
trying to achieve "immediate," rather than "initial," transferee
status, the more its good faith might be put in jeopardy.
The next section 550(b) element, "value," will probably always
be satisfied in a preference situation because an "antecedent
debt" will have been satisfied. But the "good faith" requirement
and lack of knowledge of voidability are matters of fact that
can vary from case to case. The case law on "lack of knowledge"
of voidability indicates that "knowledge" means actual, not
constructive knowledge of facts that would make a transfer
voidable, 15 and could possibly include knowing enough about
potential voidability to investigate further. 56
155. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th
Cir. 1988); Smith v. Mixon, 788 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1986); Hoerner v. Elkins
(In re Elkins), 94 Bankr. 935 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Eder v. Queen City Grain,
Inc. (In re Queen City Grain, Inc.), 51 Bankr. 723 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
The Seventh Circuit in Bonded Financial held that a bank did not have
knowledge of voidability when it (1) followed instructions to debit an initial
transferee's account for $200,000 to reduce that transferee's fully secured debt
to the bank after the bank had earlier been aware (2) that the debtor
corporation (which owed the bank nothing) had transferred the $200,000 to
the initial transferee's account. 838 F.2d at 895. It was that transfer to the
initial transferee, who was the owner of the debtor firm and who had an
account at the bank, that was avoidable as fraudulent. The court implied that
this combination of events probably did not create a duty on the bank's part
to investigate to ascertain "voidability," and that even if it had investigated,
it would have learned nothing. Hence it lacked "knowledge" of voidability
and could keep the $200,000. Id. at 898.
The Fourth Circuit in Smith v. Mixon held that an initial transferee's father
who took property as "immediate transferee" while a prior mortgage was still
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Applying this to a preference context means that a lender
could get the section 550(b) defense if it could show that it was
in good faith and did not know any one or more of the
following:
(1) that the transfer had been to or for the benefit of a creditor,
(2) that it was made on account of an antecedent debt,
(3) that the debtor was insolvent when it was made,
(4) that bankruptcy would occur within one year, or
(5) that the initial transferee would be better off on account of
the transfer.5 7
This analysis underscores what is evident on the face of section
550(b): to get the defense, it pays to be ignorant. But what
of record might have had "constructive notice" of the mortgage, but "knowl-
edge" was more than constructive notice. 788 F.2d at 231-32. Furthermore,
transferee-father did not have knowledge of the debtor's financial difficulties.
The father was not liable to the trustee for the debtor who had fraudulently
transferred the property to the initial transferee. Id.
The two lower court cases in the Sixth Circuit, both of which concerned
property that had been the subject of a fraudulent transfer, say that "knowl-
edge of voidability" in § 550(b) means knowledge of facts that would support
the trustee's avoidance case. 94 Bankr. at 937-38; 51 Bankr. at 728. In a
fraudulent conveyance context, for example, to be liable to the trustee a
subsequent transferee would have to know that the debtor (1) had been
insolvent and (2) had received less than reasonably equivalent value for what
the subsequent transferee later took from the initial transferee.
156. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 897-
98 (7th Cir. 1988). See Countryman, The Trustee's Recovery in Preference
Actions, 3 BmAxRx. DEv. J. 449, 472-82 (1986).
157. Collier's treatment of § 550(b)(1) underlines the importance of knowl-
edge that bankruptcy is approaching:
To be protected under § 550(b)(1), a subsequent transferee must take
"without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided." Neither
the Code nor the legislative history interprets this standard. The language
appears to be derived from section 4-609(b)(1) of the Commission's bill,
and was included as surplusage to illustrate a transferee that could not
be in good faith. The Commission intended the standard to mean "if the
transferee knew facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that
the property [transferred] was recoverable." With respect to prepetition
transfers that are recoverable only if a petition seeking relief under the
Bankruptcy Code is filed, the transferee should be held to have knowledge
of the voidability of the transfer if, inter alia, he has reasonable cause
to believe that a petition may be filed.
4 COLLIER, supra note 58, 550.03, at 550-60 (15th ed. 1990).
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sensible lender will aspire to ignorance? And in what setting
will ignorance be most plausible, and where will it be least
plausible?
Cartage itself is a situation in which the lender's ignorance
would be consistent with both reasonable banking practice and
subjective good faith. Since the bank was relying on the Fosters'
credit, it would not be surprising if it did not know much about
the firm's solvency, nor if and when it might file a bankruptcy
petition.
The Cartage situation should be contrasted, however, with
the relationship that exists between a lender and a large firm
that has real credit, real assets, a future to be optimistic about,
and insiders who if they had to perform a loan guaranty would
be left insolvent. The firm in this case is the real borrower from
the bank's credit judgment perspective. Suppose, however, that
the form of the Cartage transaction were followed. That is, on
paper, an insider were the borrower and the money loaned went
into the firm. If the firm later went into bankruptcy, and if the
loan repayments had been determinedly funnelled back to the
bank through the insider, the outward appearances of the Cartage
situation would be duplicated.
A lender in this situation, however, would have two problems,
of which the trustee's preference case would be the lesser. In
the preference recovery case, the trustee would have excellent
prospects of defeating the section 550(b) defense because of the
obviousness of the lender's ploy: good faith would be hard to
establish even if a wilfully ignorant lender could somehow
demonstrate that it did not know the pertinent facts about its
real customer, the firm. But the real problem would not be the
preference case. The real problem would be trying to assert in
the bankruptcy proceeding that the lender was a creditor at all,
when the only borrower listed on its loan papers was the (now)
insolvent insider.
Therefore, exact duplication of the Cartage payback method,
outside the financial context that existed in Cartage, will probably
be ineffective.
Adjustment of the Cartage model by making the firm a co-
debtor with the non-solvent insiders would obviate the
embarrassment of not having a claim in the firm's bankruptcy
case; but it would leave the lender with the same "good faith"
issues to confront, based on the lender's deliberate structuring
of the repayments through the insiders. Moreover, when both
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the firm and the insiders are formal borrowers, it would seem
to be more difficult to characterize the lender as anything other
than an "initial transferee," even if it took payments made to
it via the insider.
As noted above, the Cartage remand to let the lender prove
the section 550(b) defense meant that the parties in Cartage had,
probably accidentally, built into their transaction the defense
that the "structural argument" proponents maintain should
always be available to lenders with insider guaranties when
recovery of pre-ninety day preferences are sought from them.
In that connection it is interesting to note that in illustrating
the kind of facts to which the "structural argument" was
intended to apply, its proponents used an example of the Cartage
type: a small company's loan was guarantied by its president."18
This is the prototype situation in which section 550(b) may do
the lender some good. Even were the "structural argument" to
be adopted by the courts, lenders who extracted insider guaranties
from insiders whose own balance sheets were not the real basis
for the loan would probably be unable to profit from the
defense.
IX. CONCLUSION
Cartage and Finn were both correctly decided. The Sixth
Circuit was right in both cases in saying that the text of the
Bankruptcy Code virtually mandated the decisions reached.
Cartage is also good bankruptcy law. But Finn is not.
Cartage is good law because a one-year reach back period for
insider guarantied loans is consistent with the reasonable
congressional purpose of deterring self-serving insider favoritism
over a one-year period in order to reduce the tendency of non-
insiders to act too soon in dismantling debtors who may have
incurred insider guarantied debt.
The two main criticisms of the Cartage rationale are not well
taken. First, Cartage does not directly undermine the central
principle of letter of credit law, the issuing bank's duty to pay
upon presentation of conforming documents. Cartage does,
however, threaten the security of banks issuing standby letters
158. Note, supra note 48, at 530.
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of credit for customers who are already in default. Banks will
therefore have to determine the status of transactions before
issuing standby letters to avoid preference vulnerability. This is
not an intolerable burden. And even in the absence of Cartage
and preference law, banks issuing such credits, which substitute
for direct preferences, are susceptible to fraudulent conveyance
attack. Cartage's implications for letters of credit are therefore
acceptable.
Second, Cartage should have no adverse impact on oversecured
creditors. The so-called "benefit" to undersecured creditors,
which has been discerned when oversecured creditors are paid,
and which would then become the predicate for avoiding and
recovering the payment made to the oversecured creditor, is
really not a "benefit," but a separate transfer. Cartage is
distinguishable from the oversecured creditor situation because
in the latter there are two debts and two transfers, while in
Cartage, as the Sixth Circuit held, there was only one transfer
(and only one debt).
Finn is bad law because if preferences are bad there is no
reason to regard them as good just because they are accomplished
in the "ordinary course." Congress nodded when it changed
section 547(c)(2) from a worthwhile exception for almost
contemporaneous transfers, which would help stave off
bankruptcy, into a loophole with no principled boundaries.
Cartage and Finn in combination are a strange pair. They
challenge Sixth Circuit lenders to discover how to get the best
of both worlds: an insider guaranty that can then be used to
pressure the debtor not only for special favorable treatment in
the form of loan repayments for the lender, but also for debtor
conformity with whatever it will take to satisfy the "ordinary
course" standards of section 547(c)(2) in the way those repayments
are made. It will be interesting to see how the Sixth Circuit
deals with lender efforts to rise to this challenge.
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